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[443] 
Network Equality 
Olivier Sylvain 
One of the clear goals of the federal Communications Act is to ensure that all Americans 
have reasonably comparable access to the Internet without respect to whom or where they 
are. Yet the main focus of policymakers and legal scholars of Internet policy today has 
been on promoting innovation, a concept that Congress barely invokes in the statute. The 
flagship regulatory intervention for this approach is “network neutrality,” a rule that 
forbids Internet providers from blocking or interfering with users’ connections. To the 
extent that net neutrality addresses the distributional goals of communications law, it 
posits that openness will foster innovation which, in turn, will draw user interest which, in 
turn, will induce investment in more and better infrastructure which, in turn, will benefit 
today’s underserved. This is the trickle down theory of Internet innovation. 
 
This Article critiques this approach. While it has its merits, the privileging of innovation in 
communications policy could exacerbate existing racial, ethnic, and class disparities 
because the quality of users’ Internet connections refract through those persistent 
demographic variables. This Article calls for a return to the distributional equality principle 
at the heart of communications law and policy.  
 
The Internet is essential to almost every aspect of our lives. Like electricity a century ago, 
it is a technology that determines how we work, campaign, exercise, learn, heal, and love. 
The benefits of a high-quality Internet connection are especially importantindeed more 
importantfor racial minorities, poor people, and all others who must negotiate 
structural inequalities in other aspects of their lives in ways that advantaged people do 
not. Policymakers and scholars accordingly must affirmatively further equality in Internet 
access, or at least adopt a regulatory approach that seeks above all to ensure equality. The 
Internet is too indispensable to rely on innovation alone. 
 
   Fordham University School of Law, Associate Professor of Law. I am grateful to Joshua 
Breitbart, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Nestor Davidson, Heather Gate, Abner Greene, Clare Huntington, 
Olati Johnson, Sonia Katyal, Joe Landau, Ron Lazebnik, Robin Lenhardt, Bruce Lincoln, Kimani 
Paul-Emile, Joel Reidenberg, Aaron Saiger, Andrew Selbst, and Maya Wiley for constructive 
conversations during the writing of this Article. I owe thanks to participants in the October 2014 
Silicon Harlem Annual Conference and the November 2014 CRT/Empirical Methods Conference at 
Fordham Law School where I presented the ideas that eventually found themselves in this paper. I am 
also grateful to Christopher Bavitz and the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law 
School for hosting my talk on this paper in July 2015. Danielle Efros provided essential research 
assistance. Finally, I am indebted to Sarah Jaramillo for her unwavering cheer and research support. 
All remaining errors here are mine. 
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Introduction 
The Internet can be a great equalizer. It enables far-flung, underserved, 
and oppressed communities to share ideas, products, and services with 
anyone around the world. It creates connections for people who would 
otherwise be isolated. We have seen this happen everywhere, from Red 
Hook, Brooklyn in the wake of Hurricane Sandy to remote mountain 
villages in San Juan Yaee, Oaxaca to the homes of chronically ill 
elementary school students in Sumter, South Carolina to the post-
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election protesters in the streets of Tehran, Iran.1 The Internet can be a 
gateway to a vast world otherwise beyond users’ reach. In this way, it can 
be a great democratizing and leveling force. 
But this is only half of the story. For the Internet to be a platform 
for communicative integration, all users must have reasonably comparable 
Internet access. Otherwise, the disadvantage that remote and underserved 
communities already experience will only worsen. 
This has been true for most communications and general use 
technologies. Indeed, universal service was the objective for which 
Congress wrote the Communications Act over eight decades ago. The 
prevailing communications technologies were different then, of course. 
But the statute’s objective was clear: lawmakers prioritized universal 
deployment in the broad terms.2 This remains true. Congress has only 
clarified this central aim over time. Today, policymakers must ensure 
that the benefits of the newest communication technologies are “ma[d]e 
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States without 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or 
sex.”3 The statute, moreover, puts the level of broadband service that 
policymakers must make available to all users in relative terms; it 
requires that access and fees charged be “reasonably comparable” no 
matter whom or where users are.4 These distributional principles must 
guide communications policymaking above all else. 
Despite this clear command, communications policymakers and 
legal scholars in the United States today overwhelmingly focus on 
ensuring that the Internet is a platform for innovation.5 And, in so doing, 
they might be complicit in perpetuating existing disparities in availability, 
adoption, and use across the country. 
Low entry costs and decentralized transmission design, the 
prevailing ethos holds, foster disruptive “generativity.”6 Online companies 
 
 1. See Robbie Brown, A Swiveling Proxy That Will Even Wear a Tutu, N.Y. Times (June 7, 
2013), http://mobile.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/education/for-homebound-students-a-robot-proxy-in-the-
classroom.html; Noam Cohen, Red Hook’s Cutting-Edge Wireless Network, N.Y. Times (Aug. 22, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/nyregion/red-hooks-cutting-edge-wireless-network.html; Jared 
Keller, Evaluating Iran’s Twitter Revolution, Atlantic (June 18, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2010/06/evaluating-irans-twitter-revolution/58337/; see also Lizzie Wade, Where 
Cellular Networks Don’t Exist, People Are Building Their Own, Wired (Jan. 14, 2015, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2015/01/diy-cellular-phone-networks-mexico/. 
 2. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2015); id. § 1302(a). 
 3. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2015). 
 4. Id. § 254(b)(3). 
 5. See, e.g., Barbara van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation (2010); Tim Wu & 
Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 Fed. 
Comm. L.J. 575 (2007); see also Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 Berkeley Tech. 
L.J. 829 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement 
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1345 (2004). 
 6. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet––And How to Stop It 80–90 (2008). 
I - Sylvain_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:42 PM 
446                                           HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:443 
like Amazon, Zipcar, Travelocity, and Uber were all once fledgling start-
ups that, through the savvy and creativity of their developers, created 
new value for customers in the retail product distribution, car rental, 
travel agency, and taxi dispatch industries. To the extent there is 
anything of the Communication Act’s commitment to equality in this 
disruption, policymakers and legal scholars assume that the spillover 
effects of innovation by talented and networked elites will eventually 
spread to everyone else.7 
This trickle down theory has guided broadband policymaking for 
the last decade.8 Even as policymakers and scholars disagree about how 
best to promote innovation on the Internet, the ascendant ethos has 
coalesced around “network neutrality,” an approach that would allow 
users and innovators to engage the Internet freely and without 
permission from their broadband providers.9 Broadband providers under 
a regime of network neutrality would be barred from blocking or 
discriminating between applications and content.10 This was the approach 
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) took when it adopted 
its Open Internet Rules in February 2015.11 The White House and the 
FCC have recited the trickle down mantra to justify the Rules as though 
it is an iron law: Internet innovation, they argue, will generate user 
interest which, in turn, will induce investment in Internet infrastructure 
which in turn, will benefit everyone.12 
 
 7. See Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources 336 (2012); 
see also Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28, Report and Order on 
Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5657 ¶ 128 (Feb. 26, 2015) (“We do not 
seek to disrupt the legitimate benefits that may accrue to edge providers that have invested in 
enhancing the delivery of their services to end users. On the contrary, such investments may contribute 
to the virtuous cycle by stimulating further competition and innovation among edge providers, to the 
ultimate benefit of consumers.”).  
 8. See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable 
Facilities, CS Docket No. 02-52, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC 
Rcd. 4798 (2002). Broadband is a regulatory term of art that the FCC has used for over the past 
decade and a half to classify high-speed connections in the “last mile.” See id. The term “broadband” is 
short hand for what Congress described in the Communications Act as “advanced telecommunications 
capability.” 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (2013). In January, the FCC updated the broadband standard to 25 
Mbps for downloads and 3 Mbps for uploads. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Finds U.S. Broadband 
Deployment Not Keeping Pace 1 (Jan. 29, 2015) (on file with author). 
 9. Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Nondiscrimination 
Rule Should Look Like, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2015); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband 
Discrimination, 2 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 141 (2003) (coining the term). 
 10. van Schewick, supra note 9, at 4; Wu, supra note 9, at 141. 
 11. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 7. 
 12. This phenomenon has been described as “the virtuous cycle of network innovation and 
[infrastructure development].” See Exec. Office of the President, Community-Based Broadband 
Solutions: The Benefits of Competition and Choice for Community Development and Highspeed 
Internet Access 6 (2015). Net neutrality has its detractors, concerned that too heavy a regulatory 
touch would undermine innovation. Providers, on this view, have an incentive to create new value for 
subscribers in ways that a flat network neutrality rule would undermine. See Christopher S. Yoo, 
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Emphasizing innovation over everything else is costly. First, as a 
regulatory objective, Congress has determined that promoting innovation 
is simply not as important as assuring substantive distributional equality.13 
At best, innovation is a third-order priority that barely makes an 
appearance in the Communications Act.14 
Second, universal deployment of broadband is vital because the 
Internet is today’s premier general use technology.15 Like electricity, the 
Internet suffuses every aspect of our daily lives. The Internet has become 
the platform through which people learn about and seek jobs, health 
care, housing, and education. It defines the way in which currency flows 
and investments are made. The Internet, moreover, has become an 
essential feature of the way in which people play, meet life partners, and 
share intimate thoughts. It plays an essential part of the way in which 
political and social movements organize and spread. And beyond making 
phones smart, the Internet today is also enabling our homes, appliances, 
cars, clothing, and general accessories to be even “smarter.”16 
In short, it is the premier communications platform through which 
public life today is shaped and is increasingly becoming the repository of 
our individual and collective identity.17 To be excluded from all of its 
affordances is either an act of defiance, ignorance, or the consequence of 
material misfortune and disadvantage. 
At best, the singular focus on innovation tenuously advances the 
imperative to make reasonably comparable communications services 
available to all Americans. Yet, the trickle down theory might even 
undermine the very economic and social benefits that policymakers and 
scholars purport will flow from network neutrality because its immediate 
beneficiaries are the very elites who already benefit from relatively 
superior service. Many Americans today have mediocre connections with 
only limited functionality.18 Still others are relatively ignorant of or 
indifferent to the full range of the Internet’s affordances and constitutive 
applications.19 And a notable number of Americans are completely shut 
 
Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 34 (2005). But even opponents share a commitment 
to innovation over other policy goals.  
 13. See infra Part I.C. 
 14. See infra Part I.C. 
 15. Cf. Robert Plotkin, The Genie in the Machine: How Computer-Automated Inventing Is 
Revolutionizing Law and Business 30 (2009) (referring to computers as “general-purpose 
machines” or “universal machines”). 
 16. See generally Zittrain, supra note 6 (exploring the past, present, and future of the Internet).  
 17. See Jaron Lanier, You Are Not a Gadget 25 (2010) (discussing the “Singularity” idea).  
 18. See Philip M. Napoli & Jonathan A. Obar, The Emerging Mobile Internet Underclass: A 
Critique of Mobile Internet Access, 30 Info. Soc’y J. 323, 326 (2014). 
 19. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment 
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data 
Improvement Act, GN Docket No. 11-121, Eighth Broadband Progress Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 10,342, 
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out, with no serviceable connections in their local residential area.20 
Recent studies show that the “digital divide” remains a stubborn 
problem, stimulating the familiar demographic fault lines of race, 
ethnicity, and income that play a significant role in determining whether 
a user has access to the Internet.21 
Race, ethnicity, and income do not just influence whether users 
have access to the Internet. Those factors also affect how they use it, 
which, in turn, fundamentally shape the nature of the online world. For 
example, Blacks, Latinos, rural residents, and low income Americans are 
more likely to access the Internet through a smartphone or other mobile 
device than Whites.22 And while this development has helped to close the 
availability and access gap, mobile devices have a narrower range of 
functionality. Today, conventional mobile devices do not have many of 
the capabilities as personal computers. Further, mobile devices are not as 
immersive because they do not have the same range of storage or 
processing capacity.23 Thus, users who can now go online because of 
mobile technology still cannot do as much online as networked elites. 
Mobile connections are not a substitute for fixed wired service.24 
These findings elaborate the pathbreaking findings that the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration published in the 
1990s on broadband availability and adoption rates.25 That report is often 
credited with coining the phrase “digital divide” and sensitizing 
policymakers and journalists to the fact of disparity between the 
“information haves and have nots.”26 
Race, ethnicity, and income continue to define availability, adoption, 
and use patterns nearly two decades later. The trickle down theory 
purports to redress these disparities, but does so through indirection: it 
promises that infrastructure investment and deployment will be the 
 
10,403–11 ¶¶ 139–56 (2012) [hereinafter Eighth Broadband Progress Report]; see also U.S. Census 
Bureau, Measuring America: Computer and Internet Trends in America (2014). 
 20. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,369–70 ¶¶ 45–47. 
 21. See David Crow, Digital Divide Exacerbates US Inequality, Fin. Times (Oct. 28, 2014, 4:03 
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b75d095a-5d76-11e4-9753-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3IIlsgT5A. 
 22. See Aaron Smith, Pew Research Ctr., Smartphones as an Internet Appliance (2011). 
Specifically, thirty-eight percent of Black/Latino smartphone users rely on their smartphones while 
only seventeen percent of non-Hispanic Whites do. Id. This distribution might reflect the role of 
median income, since users with incomes of less than $30,000 were more than twice as likely as those 
with incomes of $50,000 or more to do so. See Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, Pew Research Ctr., 
Digital Differences (2012). 
 23. See Napoli & Obar, supra note 18, at 324; Eli Noam, Let Them Eat Cellphones: Why Mobile 
Wireless Is No Solution for Broadband, 1 J. on Info. Pol’y 470, 480–81 (2011). 
 24. Cf. Susan P. Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2343, 235556 (2014).  
 25. See generally Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., Falling Through the Net: Defining the 
Digital Divide (1999) (examining which American households have access to telephones, computers, 
and the Internet, and which do not). 
 26. See id. at Executive Summary. 
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fortuitous by-products of formal neutrality. But, unless policymakers 
address disparity head-on, neutrality could just as likely worsen existing 
inequalities in the short and long term because its first and most 
immediate beneficiaries are networked elites. That is, even when networks 
are “open,” actually existing structural patterns of disparity and difference 
will remain and determine the ways through which users engage the 
Internet. If these are not reversed, the relative advantage in access that 
networked elites hold will reproduce itself over time until it eventually 
becomes entrenched. 
Surprisingly, an unintendedand unrecognizedbenefit of the 
FCC’s network neutrality proceeding, as well as a series of other recent 
regulatory interventions, is an opening to reclaim the core distributional 
concerns of the Communications Act.27 The FCC has declared that the 
Internet is a public general use technologylike electricityand, 
accordingly, must be treated under law as a common carrier. Under this 
rule, service providers must ensure that all members of the public who 
try to access the Internet are treated equally.28 While the FCC’s vision of 
equal treatment is predicated on formal neutrality, the Open Internet 
Rules provide a legal foundation for a new commitment to substantive 
equality. 
This Article uses this potential new commitment to argue for a 
return to the fundamental principle of equality over neutrality. Some 
legal scholars already have done pioneering work on bias, discrimination, 
and harassment in social networking and elsewhere online, and the law’s 
potential role in stamping them out.29 It is time to turn this project for law 
reform to broadband infrastructure and service.30 In this vein, the 
 
 27. It took strong public pushback to get to this opening. The pivot toward the focus on disparity 
was chiefly inspired by the public’s record-breaking resistance to the FCC and its Chairman’s 
intentions to use the neutrality rules to encourage “economic growth, investment, innovation, free 
expression, and competition.” Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Comm. and Tech. (2014) (statement of Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC). The gist of 
the public’s reaction was not on the form or pace of innovation, but, rather, on the unadorned problem 
of inequality. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Is Deluged with Comments on Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. Times 
(July 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/technology/a-deluge-of-comment-on-net-rules.html; 
Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Begins Investigation into Quality of Internet Download Speeds, N.Y. Times 
(June 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/business/media/FCC-inquiry-into-ties-between-
content-companies-and-service-providers.html?_r=2. 
 28. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules to Protect the Open Internet 
(Feb. 26, 2015) (on file with author). 
 29. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61 (2009); Jerry Kang, 
Cyber-Race, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1130 (2000). 
 30. In an article that I published five years ago, I addressed the FCC’s failure to abide by 
important public-regarding procedural norms (embodied in administrative law doctrine, for example) 
in its implementation of broadband policy. See Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and Democratic 
Legitimacy, 62 Fed. Comm. L.J. 205 (2010). There, I argued that the agency relied too uncritically on 
engineering norms in order to promulgate its rules. Now, however, that the agency’s authority to 
regulate broadband has been scrutinized by federal courts and its current plan for regulating the 
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Article builds on research on the current “digital divide,” but especially 
scholarship by Jerry Kang on the similitude and tension in the language 
of nondiscrimination in debates concerning network neutrality and civil 
rights.31 The Article argues that broadband disparity continues to have 
consequences for how the poor and racial and ethnic minorities integrate 
into a host of contexts. 
In doing so, however, this Article makes two novel contributions to 
existing scholarship. First, it attempts to excavate and revive communication 
law’s core commitment to substantive distributional equality and identifies 
it as a principle that should guide policy in this area. Second, it urges a 
shift in regulatory and scholarly focus that better reflects distributional 
concerns. It does so by identifying interventions for the future.  
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes the trickle down 
theory of Internet innovation, arguing that innovation is not a core or 
even second-order priority of the Communications Act. Deployment and 
distributional equality, it shows, are the primary objectives of public law 
in this area. Part II describes the current state of broadband service 
generally and the distributional fault lines in availability, access, and use. 
These raw facts underscore how misplaced the singular focus on 
innovation has been. That the Internet is a general use technology 
strongly suggests that access and use disparities will exacerbate racial, 
ethnic, and income disparities elsewhere in public life. Part III describes 
the network neutrality, as well as “Open Internet” proceeding that led 
the FCC to promulgate the new rules. While the agency remains loyal to 
the trickle down theory of innovation, this Article shows, the agency 
acceded to the public’s demand for equality in broadband policy. 
In Part IV, the Article lays out the positive argument for network 
equality. First, it argues that the concept of substantive equality supplies 
a productive framework for the regulation of broadband service in ways 
that the prevailing focus on innovation and formal neutrality do not. It 
shows, moreover, that recent federal policy holds untapped potential to 
foster distributional equality of broadband resources, but the FCC has 
not done enough. Formal neutrality in access to bandwidth is meaningless 
without greater attention to inequality in the constitutive elements of the 
network itself. This final Part concludes by summarizing some of the 
limitations of the network equality framing. 
I.  The Trickle Down Theory of Internet Innovation 
All communication technologies shape public life. The Internet is no 
different. Like industrial book publishing, postal roads, telegraphy, and 
 
provision of service has been subjected to public notice and comment, I turn to the substance of the 
agency’s policies. 
 31. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Race.Net Neutrality, 6 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 1 (2007). 
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radio broadcasting in the past,32 the Internet has facilitated new forms of 
expression and community.33 
The transmission design on which the Internet has been based for 
almost four decades enables lay users to communicate almost anything 
with others anywhere around the world. Thus, today, a user can draw on 
the vast amounts of information coursing through the Internet to 
navigate the physical world with little more than a laptop or smart phone. 
A tourist can, for example, uncover transportation routes, discover the 
best local eateries, find a restroom, and avoid risky situations, all while 
video chatting with a friend miles away. But, of course, the Internet 
affords so much more. A paraplegic patient who lives outside of 
Dubuque can video chat with a kidney specialist in Chicago. A pop band 
in Cape Town can collaborate with likeminded musicians in Paris. 
Political activists can organize street protests in Cairo from anywhere 
around the world. The possibilities seem endless. 
Today’s raw physical political economy of Internet access––
broadband––sits in stark contrast to all of this dynamic possibility 
because users in most local areas have the option of only one or two 
providers.34 As gatekeepers in these areas, they have the incentive to 
extract fees from casual users and sophisticated edge providers like 
Netflix and Amazon. These fees cause little concern to those who can 
afford the premium service; they continue to transmit and download 
online services and applications as they wish. But those who cannot 
afford the better service can only scratch the surface of the Internet’s rich 
affordances. 
Until recently, in the United States, local access providers’ 
pecuniary prerogatives generally determined lay users’ service quality. 
They could offer tiered pricing schemes so that people who wanted or 
simply could afford better service could pay for it.35 Access providers 
could also enter into specialized arrangements with major Internet 
companies and edge providers to quicken or otherwise privilege access to 
subscribers. Lay users generally have had little choice in the matter. One 
recent manifestation of this practice is “zero-rating,” where mobile 
service providers do not count subscribers’ connections to affiliated 
content or applications against data usage limits.36 Mobile providers 
implement such plans to gain an obvious advantage over competitors. 
 
 32. See James W. Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society 155–77 
(1992); Richard John, Network Nation (2010); see also Sylvain, supra note 30, at 265–67. 
 33. Cf. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (1983) (exploring role of capitalism and 
printing, rise of nation-states, and use of language in the creation and growth of communities). 
 34. Susan P. Crawford, Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly Power in 
the New Gilded Age 3, 120–22, 185–86 (2013). 
 35. van Schewick, supra note 9, at 127. 
 36. Id. at 30. 
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There are reasons to believe that zero-rating might actually help spawn 
Internet access in developing countries.37 
This past February, the FCC substantially circumscribed the extent 
to which access providers could leverage their market position in this 
way. The agency promulgated new Open Internet Rules that forbid 
broadband providers from blocking or discriminating between different 
kinds of Internet applications and content. Its animating reason for the 
rules is to encourage innovation. The Commission employs the following 
syllogism to justify this approach: unimpeded innovation by application 
developers will generate more user interest which, in turn, will induce 
access providers to invest in infrastructure which, in turn, will benefit 
everyone, including the underserved. This is the trickle down theory of 
Internet innovation. The new rules do this by requiring broadband 
providers to be “neutral” in how they manage their users’ connections.38 
The FCC is not alone in its commitment to promoting innovation. 
The concept has been the animating concern for the President and other 
top-level federal policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders on all sides of 
the network neutrality debate for well over a decade.39 The main 
disagreement has been over which regulatory arrangement creates the 
most value for consumers. But innovation is the driving concern for most. 
The following passage from a January 2015 report by the President’s 
National Economic Council and Council of Economic Advisers captures 
the prevailing view: 
Over the longer term, broadband adoption also fuels a virtuous cycle of 
Internet innovation. This cycle begins when new applications of the 
Internet create demand for more bandwidth, resulting in a wave of 
network-level innovation and infrastructure investment. As more 
bandwidth becomes available, application-sector innovators find new 
ways to use that capacity, creating additional demand, leading to 
another round of network investment, and so on. While it is impossible 
to know what the next bandwidth-hungry killer application will be . . . 
both history and economic theory show that this virtuous cycle is a 
powerful driver of innovation and economic growth.40 
 
 37. See Diana Carew, Zero-Rating: Kick-Starting Internet Ecosystems in Developing Countries, 
Progressive Pol’y Inst. (Mar. 2015), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ 
2015.03-Carew_Zero-Rating_Kick-Starting-Internet-Ecosystems-in-Developing-Countries.pdf. 
 38. See discussion infra Part III. 
 39. See, e.g., van Schewick, supra note 5; Wu & Yoo, supra note 5; Net Neutrality, White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality#section-read-the-presidents-statement (Oct. 28, 2015); Tim 
Wu, Why Have Telecommunications Law?: Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. on 
Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 15, 26 (2006) [hereinafter Wu, Why Have Telecommunications Law?]; 
Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at Silicon Flatirons Center, Boulder, Colorado (Feb. 9, 2015) 
(transcript available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman-wheeler-silicon-flatirons-center-boulder- 
colorado). 
 40. Exec. Office of the President, supra note 12. 
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Policymakers did not originate this framing. They owe it almost 
entirely to the most prominent information and Internet law scholars and 
thought leaders of the past decade.41 The consensus view among 
advocates and opponents of intervention is that, whatever regulatory 
arrangement policymakers formulate, they should ensure that the Internet 
remains an engine for innovation.42 Advocates generally argue that, in 
order for the Internet to continue to thrive, application developers must 
be able to “innovate without permission.”43 Opponents, on the other 
hand, assert that the price mechanism in the market is the best way to 
allocate costs and risks, and that service providers should be given the 
freedom to develop affiliations with content and application developers 
to create new value for subscribers.44 
In any event, both sides of the debate presume that, whatever 
regulatory choice the agency makes, innovation fosters a wide range of 
incidental or spillover economic and social benefits that accrue to society 
as a result. This Part outlines the contours of the debate. 
A. Network Neutrality as Innovation Policy 
Neutrality advocates argue that service providers should not be able 
to ration the quality of users’ broadband connections to further their own 
pecuniary interests. The staunchest advocates accordingly oppose any 
proposal that would allow providers to charge a premium to prioritize 
some Internet connections over others. They argue that most users and 
application start-ups would not be able to afford the specialized 
treatment, and that this asymmetry would work to the detriment of 
invention and innovation on the Internet generally. After all, these 
advocates point out, online giants like Google and Netflix were once 
start-ups, too, and only succeeded because they did not have to pay a 
premium to reach users.45 
Many of these advocates accordingly argue for a flat-out ban on 
application and content discrimination. They argue that all Internet 
users, large or small, should be able to access the applications, content, 
services, and networked devices of their choice. Access providers, they 
argue, should not block or otherwise interfere with users’ ability to share 
 
 41. See, e.g., van Schewick, supra note 5; Wu & Yoo, supra note 5; see also von Lohmann, supra 
note 5; Lemley & Reese, supra note 5.  
 42. See, e.g., Wu, Why Have Telecommunications Law?, supra note 39, at 26. 
 43. See van Schewick, supra note 9, at 24–27 n.76.  
 44. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An 
Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 19, 24–26 
(2009); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The 
Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1822, 1848–49 (2007); Yoo, supra note 12, at 34. 
 45. See Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires 284 (2010) 
(discussing the rise of Google and the threat that it and other edge providers face from broadband 
providers). 
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ideas and content freely; developers should not have to worry about 
contracting with providers in order to reach users.46 Instead, they argue, 
providers should be forbidden from discriminating against different 
applications or content. Providers should simply just use their best efforts 
to deliver data to their intended destination irrespective of application.47 
Such a rule, they assert, would ensure that the Internet continues to be 
the dynamic platform for innovation it has been for the past two to three 
decades.48 Paid prioritization, on the other hand, would only encourage 
providers to supply high-quality service to those who are willing to pay. 
“Strong open Internet rules,” they argue, “are necessary to preserve the 
virtual cycle of innovation and investment and ensure that the Internet 
remains a robust platform for consumer choice, economic growth and 
free speech.”49 
Neutrality advocates, moreover, point to providers’ demonstrable 
interest in controlling user access to competitor services and applications. 
For example, Comcast, the most notorious of access providers among 
neutrality advocates, sought approval from federal regulators of its 
proposed merger with Time Warner, another dominant access provider.50 
The merger would have reached about a third of U.S. homes, far more 
than any of their competitors.51 The companies expected that, by joining 
forces, they would meet increasing demand for better Internet-based 
services and create new value for their subscribers. Neutrality advocates 
feared that the new combination would exert unprecedented control over 
Internet connections.52 After all, both companies have employed network 
management practices that leverage their strong market position at the 
expense of start-up edge providers.53 They have also degraded 
connections to rival video and voice applications, ostensibly to protect 
 
 46. Letter from Michael Beckerman, President & CEO, The Internet Ass’n, to Marlene H. 
Dortch, Sec’y, FCC (Jan. 6, 2015) (on file with FCC); see also Susan P. Crawford, Transporting 
Communications, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 871, 887 (2009); Wu, supra note 9, at 150. 
 47. See Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources 348–55 
(2012); Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 
359, 403–04 (2007). 
 48. Wu, Why Have Telecommunications Law?, supra note 39, at 26; Wu, supra note 9, at 150. For 
advocates of this strong neutrality rule, access providers would only be excused from such obligations 
in the event of a targeted attack, virus, or other demonstrable threat to the operation of the local 
network. 
 49. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Beckerman, supra note 46, at 1.  
 50. Cade Metz, Why the Comcast-Time Warner Deal Is Far More Dangerous than You Think, 
Wired (Feb. 13, 2014, 4:25 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/02/comcasts-45bn-time-warner-buy-
change-everything/; Sanjay Sanghoee, Why the Feds Should Block Comcast’s Merger with Time 
Warner Cable, Fortune (Apr. 22, 2014, 2:27 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/04/22/why-the-feds-should-
block-comcasts-merger-with-time-warner-cable/. 
 51. Metz, supra note 50; Sanghoee, supra note 50. 
 52. Sanghoee, supra note 50. 
 53. Metz, supra note 50. 
I - Sylvain_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:42 PM 
February 2016]     NETWORK EQUALITY 455 
their own affiliated applications or services from the competition.54 Partly 
in response to strong public resistance to the merger, the FCC signaled 
its wariness about the deal.55 Seeing the writing on the wall, Comcast and 
Time Warner withdrew the plan. 
Generally, neutrality advocates endorse a general rule against data 
discrimination, but would accommodate network management practices 
that assure “quality of service” for real-time or latency-sensitive audio or 
video applicationsthat is, accommodations for applications that require 
data to be sent in a particular way in order for the applications with 
which they are associated to function as they should.56 Such an exception 
recognizes that being completely agnostic about the applications or bits 
of data that flow through the network would diminish the quality of some 
of the most popular video streaming applications. A rule of perfect 
neutrality that makes no exceptions for latency-sensitive applications, 
these advocates argue, would actually be biased in favor of applications 
like e-mail or even web browsers that are not as latency sensitive. 
Opponents of network neutrality argue that access providers pose 
no real harm to the vast majority of Internet users. For them, the 
question should not be whether broadband providers’ networks must be 
open but rather how policy can help providers create the most value for 
consumers. They argue that, instead, policymakers should take lessons 
from competition law.57 The antitrust laws after all protect consumers 
and small companies from the predations of dominant incumbents.58 
Thus, regulators should focus instead on whether access providers 
actually have market power or engage in unfair trade practices.59 If they 
 
 54. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Madison River Communications, 
LLC, File No. EB-05-IH-0110, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (Enf’t Bureau 2005) (order adopting consent 
decree); see also Press Release, supra note 28. 
 55. Devika Krishna Kumar, Comcast Drops Time Warner Cable Bid After Antitrust Pressure, Reuters 
(Apr. 24, 2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-comcast-timewarnercable-idUSKBN0N 
E2D220150424. 
 56. See Wu, supra note 9, at 165. “Latency is a measure of the time it takes for a packet of data to 
travel from one point to another in a network and often is measured by round-trip in milliseconds.” 
Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,362 ¶ 23. 
 57. There has been hearty debate among scholars about how to administer network management 
regulations. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 529, 
569 (2009) (arguing a self-regulatory body subject to public agency oversight as best strategy for 
Internet regulation); Sylvain, supra note 30 (arguing for a participatory governance approach to 
Internet policymaking). 
 58. See John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers 
from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2425, 2433 (2013) (arguing that consumer welfare 
is the priority in antitrust law based on legislative history, case law, popular opinion, and ease of 
administration); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 Fordham L. 
Rev. 2471, 2474 (2013); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: 
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 191, 211–36 (2008). 
 59. See generally Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to 
the Network Economy (1998) (applying traditional economic theories to modern information-based 
technologies). 
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do not, advocates of this perspective argue, access providers should be 
able to affiliate or negotiate connection terms with edge providers like 
Netflix or Google on an individualized basis.60 Regulators could assess 
the validity of such arrangements on a case-by-case basis. Such an 
approach, critics of the Open Internet Rules argue, would increase value 
for consumers and invite innovations that only special vertical and 
horizontal arrangements can create.61 In any event, they note that price is 
an essential signal of consumers’ willingness to pay. Tiered pay-for-
priority schemes like these allow providers to earn a return on their 
investment while also allowing consumers to express their respective service 
preferences. 
Other opponents express support for some network neutrality 
regulation of service providers, but strongly resist rendering broadband 
service “a utility” for fear that it would inhibit or delay investment and 
innovation in nascent applications and services. For example, these 
opponents hold, such approach could stall improvements in new mobile 
health products and services like remote monitoring of patients and 
mobile-connected pill bottles.62 Thus, while this group’s opposition to 
network neutrality is more narrowly tailored to defining the service as “a 
utility” (akin to electricity), it is nevertheless similarly grounded in support 
for innovation. 
B. What the Innovation Fixation Misses 
The debate among policymakers and scholars about how to allocate 
duties and costs in furtherance of innovation in the market for 
broadband service has framed federal policymakers’ decisionmaking in 
the area for the past decade or so. But the preoccupation with innovation 
in information law and public policy has been in vogue for much longer, 
influencing technology company managers, scholars, and policymakers 
inside and outside of communications.63 
 
 60. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659–61 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
 61. Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Open Internet Rulemaking, GN Docket Nos. 10-
127, 14-28, Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless (July 15, 2014); see also Ev Ehrlich, Net 
Neutrality Sounds Good, but It’s Worse, SFGate (July 24, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/ 
openforum/article/Net-neutrality-sounds-good-but-it-s-worse-5645596.php; Ariel Rabkin, The Internet Isn’t 
Plumbed Like the Water System, Tech. Pol’y Daily (July 16, 2014), http://www.techpolicydaily.com/ 
communications/internet-isnt-plumbed-like-water-system/. 
 62. See Letter from Joel White, Exec. Dir., Health IT Now Coal., Bradley Merrill Thompson, 
Gen. Counsel, M-Health Regulatory Coal., Robert B. McCray, President & CEO, Wireless-Life Scis. 
All., to Tom Wheeler, Chairman Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, et al. (Jan. 15, 2015) (on file with FCC). 
 63. I do not seek here to answer the important question of how innovation has prevailed on 
policymakers at the expense of other important regulatory priorities. It is enough here to observe, 
simply, that innovation is in vogue. See generally Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s 
Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Films to Fail (1997) (addressing significance of 
corporate response to innovation in technology and change in market); see also Jill Lepore, The 
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Consider the influence of Moore’s Law, a concept original to 
information and computer science.64 In 1965, Gordon Moore, who was 
then the leading researcher for a major semiconductor developer in 
Silicon Valley, predicted that microchip processing capacity would 
increase by “roughly a factor of two per year.”65 That is, improvements in 
computing capacity would occur at a predictable exponential rate over 
time. That claim has not been perfectly realized because, in fact, 
advances in the area come in fits and starts.66 Nevertheless, the gist of the 
claim has been influential.67 Moore’s prediction has proven persuasive 
enough that top researchers and technology company managers now 
count on it like a law of physics.68 Manufacturers were integrating it into 
their industrial design practices within a decade of its announcement. 
The largest semiconductor makers today continue to rely on it to 
measure the pace of their manufacturing and marketing efforts, 
irrespective of whether in fact it accurately describes the pace of their 
native development processes. 
As influential as it is, however, Moore’s Law is also very limited in 
scope; it does not explain (or purport to explain) the manner in which 
processing capacity is distributed among lay consumers. In fact, while 
contemporary developers are the likeliest to benefit from each 
incremental improvement in computing capacity, most consumers do not 
bear witness to each of the advances. In this regard, Moore’s Law does 
not offer an account of how different segments of the population actually 
receive or benefit from improvements in processing capacity. Moreover, 
the rate of improvement in computing capacity varies by device and most 
users do not have access to anything but mass produced devices. 
Communications and management scholars have recognized as much, 
having developed taxonomies of adoption that explain how new 
technologies disseminate through society over timefrom beta release 
to popular adoption to obsolescence.69 
These actual distributional factors are precisely what the 
preoccupation with innovation misses. This is not to say that policymakers 
 
Disruption Machine: What the Gospel of Innovation Gets Wrong, New Yorker (June 23, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2014/06/23/140623fa_fact_lepore?currentPage=all. 
 64. See Bob Schaller, The Origin, Nature, and Implications of “Moore’s Law” (1996). 
 65. Id. at 7. 
 66. See, e.g., John Markoff, IBM Discloses Working Version of a Much Higher-Capacity Chip, 
N.Y. Times (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/technology/ibm-announces-computer-
chips-more-powerful-than-any-in-existence.html?_r=0. 
 67. To understand the force of the claim, note that the theory of natural selection in evolutionary 
biology does not purport to predict the rate at which prevalent observable human characteristics 
change. 
 68. Cornelis Disco, Getting New Technologies Together 206–07 (1998); see also Schaller, 
supra note 64. 
 69. See generally George M. Beal & Joe M. Bohlen, The Diffusion Process (1981) (discussing 
how farmers accept new tools and ideas). 
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and scholars have not addressed distributional concerns when they 
discuss innovation. They have. But their focus has been narrow. At least 
in the Open Internet Rules, the FCC has sought to allocate duties and 
entitlements that balance the interests of a very narrow range of 
networked elites, including, for example, start-up application developers, 
prominent edge providers, local access providers, and major television 
and film production studios. The average lay users are secondary. The 
underservedthe people for whom Congress arguably enacted the 
Communications Actare overlooked. 
C. Innovation Is a Third-Order Public Law Priority 
In its new rules, the FCC generally seeks to facilitate innovation by 
requiring local access providers to treat data neutrallythat is, to refrain 
from discriminating or blocking Internet connections based on the data 
they contain or the edge providers and users from which they originate. 
But these rules do not concern themselves directly with the distributional 
question of whether or how lay users receive and use those connections. 
And to the extent that the rules do, they do so only through indirection. 
That is, policymakers assume that innovation (by the narrow band of 
developers mentioned above) will trickle down to lay users, irrespective 
of how its outputs get distributed among them. 
But Congress made universal service deployment the primary 
concern of the Communications Act. The statute has many other, 
second-order objectives addressed to the telecommunications and 
information services industries, including infrastructure investment,70 
competition and interconnection,71 privacy,72 law enforcement,73 and 
national security.74 The amended statute, however, is unequivocal about 
its central purpose. Its first paragraph provides that the FCC is 
to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United 
States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide 
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at 
reasonable charges.75 
Congress added the absolutist language in this provision (in essence, 
“without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
 
 70. See 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2015); see also id. § 157. 
 71. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202 (2015); id. §§ 251, 252. 
 72. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–2522 (West 2015). 
 73. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1001–1021 (1994).  
 74. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 75. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996). Before 1996, the provision simply provided that the FCC was 
responsible for “regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as 
to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, 
nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service.” Id. 
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origin, or sex”) in 1996 to ensure “nondiscrimination.”76 This concept was 
far different from the pro-competitive sense of “nondiscrimination” as it 
has appeared in the network neutrality debate. Where the latter is 
addressed to applications or services, in 1996, Congress sought to make 
plain that the FCC’s central purpose is to protect users and people from 
discrimination irrespective of their station in life. Congress reiterated this 
point in Section 706 of the 1996 amendments.77 In this way, the Act, 
including and especially the 1996 amendments, bespeaks Congress’ 
unequivocal commitment to ensuring that communication technology is 
widely available to all users irrespective of who or where they are. And 
further that such service be “reasonably comparable.”78 
Congress has been consistent about this statutory objective across 
media platforms. For example, again, in the 1996 amendments, Congress 
announced a “national policy of diversity of media voices” in recognition 
that too few broadcast stations and producers were owned or operated 
by racial minorities or women.79 The FCC subsequently relied on this 
1996 amendment to propose a rule that would explicitly forbid 
discrimination on the basis of such characteristics. It sought to eliminate 
longstanding patterns of exclusion in order to diversify programming 
over the airwaves in a way that better reflected the variety of tastes of 
U.S. consumers. 
Congress, on the other hand, has not made innovation even a 
secondary regulatory priority in the Communications Act. It invokes the 
concept in the statute only rarely.80 In the few instances in which 
Congress does use some cognate of the term in the Act, it is just one of a 
variety of factors that the FCC must consider before making a specific 
regulatory decision. Congress, for example, invokes the term in connection 
with the FCC’s authority to determine whether a telecommunications 
access provider has complied with rate requirements.81 In this context, 
innovation is just one of a handful of factors that the agency must 
consider. The only other place in which Congress chose to use the word 
“innovate” or “innovative” in the Act is in reference to the general 
policy priorities of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.82 There, 
 
 76. H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 32 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 77. See 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1996) (“The Commission and each State commission with regulatory 
jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and 
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”). 
 78. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 18. 
 79. See 47 U.S.C. § 257(a), (c) (1996). 
 80. The word “innovation” appears just two times in the Communications Act, “innovative” 
appears just once, and “innovate” is absent entirely.  
 81. 47 U.S.C. § 226(h)(3) (2015) (discussing the breadth of service offerings, service quality, and price). 
 82. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (2015). 
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innovation must be weighed against program “quality, diversity, 
creativity, [and] excellence.”83 
But the statute’s relative indifference to innovation has evidently 
not been an impediment for those debating the substantive merits of 
network neutrality. Purely as a matter of constitutional and administrative 
law doctrine, however, the text of the statute must constrain the scope of 
the agency’s authority to promulgate rules in the area. The FCC 
accordingly has hewed to some stated authority in the Act in order to 
announce the new rules, all while remaining loyal to its real interest in 
innovation. Specifically, the FCC has turned to provisions that encourage 
universal deployment of broadband.84 Its argument proceeds as follows: 
openness and nondiscrimination encourage users and developers to 
create new applications and content; the more varied Internet 
applications are, the more likely that users will adopt broadband service; 
the more new users, the more likely that providers will invest in their 
networks and reach even more new users. For the agency and other 
proponents of the trickle down orthodoxy, universal deployment is 
innovation’s happy by-product. 
In fact, however, the FCC’s real interest in innovation is orthogonal 
to the statute’s core distributional concern. The rules, after all, will 
remain fully applicable well after everyone is well connected, precisely 
because universality is not their statutory objective.85 This is not to say 
that a perfectly open national system of broadband might not encourage 
universal employment. Nor is this to say that the Open Internet Rules 
are illegitimate to the extent they promote innovation or encourage 
entrepreneurship and competition. The D.C. Circuit rightfully held that 
infrastructure investment is a reasonable objective of the rules under 
Title I of the Communications Act.86 The point I make here is that, under 
the statute, innovation is at best a third-order priority under the 
Communications Act. As it relates to broadband in particular, Congress 
actually expressed near indifference about how the FCC should regulate 
broadbandwhether through a system of openness or something else. 
Instead, the statute authorizes the agency to regulate or simply refrain 
from regulating broadband, as long as, whatever action the agency 
chooses “encourage[s]” broadband service “deployment on a reasonable 
and timely basis.”87 
 
 83. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2)(C) (2015). 
 84. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 643–45 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Eighth Broadband Progress 
Report, supra note 19, at 10,385 ¶ 92; Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 
GN Docket No. 09-191, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,905 ¶ 1 (2010). 
 85. The agency anticipates universal broadband adoption by 2022. See Eighth Broadband 
Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,344–45 ¶ 3. 
 86. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 642. 
 87. The statute provides in pertinent part that in order to “encourage the deployment on a 
reasonable and timely basis” of broadband service, the FCC has the discretion to choose between 
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Universal deployment is not a matter that should be so easily 
contorted to advance other objectives. The Communications Act asserts 
that the FCC’s core reason for being is to protect against distributional 
unfairness in the delivery of emergent communications services. To 
acknowledge as much would focus attention to whether broadband in the 
United States is available “to all Americans.” 
The answer to that inquiry is not a happy one. At least, it is 
complicated. As I show below in Part II, the Internet ecosystem today is 
defined by disparity and difference. There, I outline what the state of 
broadband service actually is in the United States, irrespective of how 
rapid the benefits of openness will flow to innovators and other 
networked elites. 
II.  The Reality of Network Disparity 
Since the establishment of the United States Postal Service in the 
late eighteenth century, universal deployment of communications 
infrastructure has long been a core public law priority in the United 
States. But the statutory injunction in the Communications Act to assure 
universal deployment of communication technologies is especially 
pertinent at a time when networked communications have become essential 
to the operation of public life. This is why the FCC and other commentators 
have rightfully called the Internet the “general use” technology of our 
time.88 
In fact, however, we are far short of universal deployment today. 
Current patterns in broadband delivery across the country suggest 
something more like “information redlining” in which providers fail to 
build and service racial and ethnic minorities or lower income and rural 
communities on the same terms as wealthier communities.89 
This Part briefly chronicles the manner in which broadband service 
is unevenly distributed. Exhaustive research by the U.S. Census Bureau, 
the Pew Research Center, and others shows definitively that, first, 
disparities in broadband availability, adoption, and use have a substantial 
impact on the manner in which different users engage the Internet and, 
second, that these disparities track existing racial, ethnic, and class fault 
 
“price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local 
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure 
investment.” 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1996). 
 88. Cf. Plotkin, supra note 15, at 30 (referring to computers as “general-purpose machines” or 
“universal machines”). 
 89. 140 Cong. Rec. 14844 (daily ed. June 28, 1994) (statement of Sen. Markey); see also John 
Eggerton, MMTC Tells Government There Is Need for More than Speed, Broadcasting & Cable (Jan. 
15, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/mmtc-tells-government-there-
need-more-speed/137119. 
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lines.90 If the Internet is the premier general use technology of our time, 
exclusion has substantial costs for the underserved and society at large. 
These findings are alarming because they run against the clear statutory 
objectives of communications law. 
A. The Promise of an Open Internet 
To understand the scope of what is at stake, it is worth noting how 
embedded the Internet is in public life today. It inhabits practically all 
aspects. Its most familiar applicationsthe World Wide Web and  
e-mailenable people to communicate with landlords, political allies, 
doctors, and lovers. Other applications provide important information to 
consumers about products and services, including comparative price 
information about health care options, cars, and homes. They enable 
house hunters to find a place to live, homemakers to survey design ideas 
for their home, job seekers to communicate with prospective employers, 
and drivers to navigate backcountry roads. 
The Internet today is also a vital component of our political culture. 
Partisans, activists, and casual users alike rely on social media and an 
array of Internet applications to mobilize people around issues and 
electoral campaigns. Some of these efforts seek to spread awareness 
about intractable sociopolitical and economic problems. Others are far 
more whimsical.91 
Ordinary people are not the only beneficiaries of the Internet’s 
affordances. The networked communication technologies of today have 
become a terrific source of data about consumers and their habits. This, 
in turn, has enabled “data brokers” and social networking administrators 
to analyze and predict user behavior and preference.92 These advances 
have created new markets in search, reputation, and finance.93 While 
many of these changes challenge conventions in national security, 
privacy, and consumer protection, firms continue to collect and share 
online data with third-party brokers quite freely. Online user data has 
become one of the driving currencies of the networked information 
 
 90. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 19; Aaron Smith, Why Pew Internet Does Not 
Regularly Report Statistics for Asian-Americans and Their Technology Use, Pew Research Ctr. (Mar. 
29, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/03/29/why-pew-internet-does-not-regularly-report-statistics-
for-asian-americans-and-their-technology-use/. 
 91. Jason Wells, Cancer Patient’s Pre-Surgery Flash Mob Dance Goes Viral, Inspires, L.A. Times 
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/08/local/la-me-ln-cancer-patient-viral-video-flash-
mob-dance-20131108. 
 92. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1701, 1760 (2010). 
 93. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money 
and Information (2015). 
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economy.94 And, users have been complicit, volunteering their information 
for fear of being left out. 
These are just the conventional affordances of the Internet. Today, 
all manners of devices and appliances are connected.95 Brick-and-mortar 
retailers, homebuilders, automobile manufacturers, and consumer 
appliance developers have over the past decade integrated networked 
communications technology into their products. Cars and homes are now 
equipped with remotely operated security and lighting systems. Clothes 
now share and collect location and biometric data about their wearers 
and the people immediately around them.96 And all of these connections 
and transactions occur seamlessly, practically in real time, giving 
consumers the sense that, no matter where they are, they are always 
connected to the networked world.97 This is what observers mean when 
they speak of the “Internet of Things.”98 
While much of this sounds like futurism, it is a core preoccupation 
of network communication technology firms today. Eric Schmidt, the 
Chairman of online search and advertising giant Google, recently 
forecasted that “the Internet will disappear” because “it will be part of 
your presence all the time.”99 Appliances, devices, and clothes, he 
predicts, will interact with the rooms we walk into and the people we 
meet, with our permission but mostly out of sight.100 This “post-Internet” 
world will depend increasingly on algorithms and other automated 
systems that will interact with each other on our behalf.101 The most 
dramatic, quasi-religious version of this portrayal envisions The Transhuman 
 
 94. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Somini Sengupta, Selling Secrets of Phone Users to Advertisers, 
N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/technology/selling-secrets-of-phone-
users-to-advertisers.html?pagewanted=all (discussing how companies like Google and Facebook are 
trying to find new ways to monetize their user bases by finding way to target them with specific ads); 
Danny Yadron, FTC Says Brokers Bid Private Data, Wall St. J. (May 7, 2013 6:22 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323687604578469392421956334. 
 95. See Pew Research Ctr., Digital Life in 2025 (2014). 
 96. Mat Honan, The Future of Wearables Isn’t a Connected Watch, Wired (Jan. 29, 2015, 5:00 
AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/01/useful-wearables/. 
 97. See Christopher Steiner, Automate This: How Algorithms Came to Rule Our World 112 
(2012). 
 98. See, e.g., Jeremy Rifkin, The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the 
Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism (2014); R.S. Raji, Smart Networks for 
Control, 31 Spectrum, IEEE 49 (1994). 
 99. Michael Moore, Google Chairman Expects Internet to ‘Disappear’ Soon, TechWeek Europe 
(Jan. 23, 2015, 12:06 PM), http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/e-innovation/eric-schmidt-google-internet- 
disappear-160126. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Cf. Ian Wallace, What Is Post-Internet Art? Understanding the Revolutionary New Art Movement, 
Artspace (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.artspace.com/magazine/interviews_features/post_internet_art 
(“[P]ost-Internet artists have moved beyond making work dependent on the novelty of the Web to 
using its tools to tackle other subjects. And while earlier Net artists often made works that existed 
exclusively online, the post-Internet generation (many of whom have been plugged into the Web since 
they could walk) frequently uses digital strategies to create objects that exist in the real world.”).  
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Singularity, in which all information is shared freely for the betterment of 
humanity.102 
The Internet in this vein has become the general repository of our 
individual and shared identities. Information about us online reflects who 
we are individually and collectively. If you are not online, you might as 
well be invisible. The benefits of online participation greatly outweigh its 
costs. Full network integration is now imperative, and exclusion, 
potentially disastrous. 
B. Internet Access Today as It Exists in Fact 
The Internet’s indispensability is not lost on most Americans. 
According to the Census Bureau’s 2013 data, about 74% of American 
households use the Internet, up from 18% in 1997.103 But its demonstrable 
growth masks the manner and rate at which lay users are connecting. To 
say that people are using the Internet more than they ever have does not 
say much about the character of their uses, or the purposes to which they 
are putting their connections. 
In fact, many people do not have all of the affordances of the 
Internet at their fingertips. We know that users and application 
developers alike, no matter how savvy they might be, are only as 
innovative and sociable online as their physical points of contact with the 
Internet allow them to be. And for many users, bad or unreliable service 
is a feature of their service rather than a bug. The disparities between 
those with great service and those with typically poor or mediocre 
connections manifest themselves in a variety of complicated ways, but 
generally correlate with race, ethnicity, and class. In other words, we are 
very far from being “post-Internet” today. 
Yet, most users just assume that high-speed Internet service is 
always available. In fact, however, it is neither speedy nor reliable for 
everyone. Only the most well-to-do have access to the best broadband 
service. That is, a relatively small fraction of Americans have platinum 
broadband service, a majority have limited but good enough service to 
engage a variety of high bandwidth applications like Netflix and other 
services simultaneously, and a small but notable fraction have poor or no 
service at all.104 This breakdown is largely defined by a variety of 
demographic factors that affect users’ willingness or ability to adopt 
service. In this regard, it is not unlike the market for goods and services 
in all of public life. From big-ticket necessities like healthcare and 
housing to more leisurely pursuits like air travel and fine dining, public 
 
 102. See Lanier, supra note 17, at 25–26. 
 103. Thom File & Camille Ryan, U.S. Census Bureau, Computer and Internet Use in the 
United States: 2013, at 2, 3 (2014). 
 104. Pew Research Ctr., Broadband Technology Fact Sheet (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
fact-sheets/broadband-technology-fact-sheet/. 
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life in the United States is characterized by an unequal distribution of 
goods and servicesa social arrangement in which the proverbial one 
percent can afford the best, a majority can afford passable goods and 
services, and a meaningful minority have little to nothing at all.105 
In this regard, broadband service disparities are not random; they 
track the very same demographic fault lines of race, ethnicity, and class 
that define public life generally in the United States. Here, in this 
Subpart, I catalogue some of the ways in which these disparities manifest 
themselves nationally. To be clear, broadband service data is generally 
difficult to synthesize. Some reports, for example, rely on obsolete or 
inapposite speed benchmarks.106 Others do not disaggregate between 
fixed and mobile broadband connections, let alone different kinds of 
fixed service, such as DSL, cable, and fiber.107 Still others do not 
distinguish between service availability like the sheer existence of service 
that passes by the home and adoption, in essence, the choice to open a 
subscription. Nevertheless there is sufficient available data to make 
modest and incontrovertible observations about broadband service 
disparity today. 
1. Access and Adoption 
Availability rates correlate significantly with locality.108 The FCC 
reported in 2012 that nineteen million Americans, six percent of the 
population, did not have fixed broadband service available to them in 
their local area.109 Three-quarters of this group lives in rural areas where 
population density is very low. One reason for this disparity is that the 
“business case” for building and administering service to remote and 
sparsely populated areas is difficult to make. Without government 
subsidies, the building and administration of new networks is prohibitively 
expensive.110 
 
 105. See generally Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Arthur Goldhammer, 
trans. 2014). This state of affairs is hardly something with which most people are comfortable. And, 
yet, disparities remain and, now, appear to have become one of the defining features of American life. 
 106. See, e.g., Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,364, 10,386–87 ¶¶ 29, 97 
(referring to 3 Mbps/768 kbps benchmark rather than current regulatory standard of 4 Mbps/1 Mbps); 
Press Release, FCC, Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan 6 (Mar. 17, 2010) (on file 
with author) (recognizing dissonance between available data reported by providers and new 
benchmark). 
 107. See, e.g., Pew Research Ctr., supra note 104. 
 108. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,379 ¶ 80; see also Olivier Sylvain, 
Broadband Localism, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 795 (2012). 
 109. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,359–58 ¶¶ 4547. Cable and DSL 
providers account for the largest portion of the service. Id. at 10,374 ¶ 60. 
 110. Id. at 10,369–86 ¶¶ 4493. 
I - Sylvain_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:42 PM 
466                                           HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:443 
Meanwhile, the rate of adoption in the United States is around 
seventy percent today.111 This is a substantial increase from 2000. The 
main barriers to user adoption are different from that for broadband 
deployment. Today’s user adoption barriers include service cost, the lack 
of digital literacy, and the perceptions about the Internet’s lack of 
relevance.112 
To put a finer point on it, about one in four American households 
with access do not use the Internet.113 About a quarter of that population 
reports that the monthly cost of broadband service is too expensive to 
justify.114 Here, income is significantly correlated with the rate at which 
households actually adopt service when it is available in their area.115 
Many in this group, moreover, tend to be older, make less than $30,000 
per year, and have less than a high school education.116 In short, income is 
among the strongest determining variables of Internet access and use.117 
Residence or geography, too, is a major factor, with states in the 
Deep South showing the lowest rates in the country of households that 
are connected to broadband.118 This geographic trend further supports 
data showing that median household income is an important driver of 
broadband adoption rates.119 
Nearly half of the people in households who choose not to subscribe 
but otherwise have access to broadband report that they simply do not 
want it.120 The most commonly given reason for why members of this 
group do not subscribe to broadband (or even dial-up) is the perception 
that the Internet is not relevant or useful to their lives.121 For example, 
many in this group find the Internet sufficiently irrelevant such that they 
 
 111. See Pew Research Ctr., supra note 104; Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 
10,394 ¶ 120 (stating the FCC reported that about two-thirds of American households had adopted the 
service by 2012); see also FCC, Internet Access Services: Status as of December 31, 2013, at 11–13 
(2014). 
 112. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,403–11 ¶¶ 13956. 
 113. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 19. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Mark Dutz et al., The Substantial Consumer Benefits of Broadband Connectivity for U.S. 
Households, Internet Innovation Reliance 28 (July 2009) (“In 2008, 88% of high-income households 
(with annual household income exceeding $100,000) [subscribed] to broadband, while only 41% of 
low-income households (with annual income less than $25,000) had adopted it.”); Smith, supra note 22, 
at 10 (finding, in 2010, that one-third of broadband users subscribed to a “premium” Internet access 
service, paying a little over forty-one dollars per month on average for it).  
 116. Smith, supra note 22, at 10; see also Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 
10,378 ¶ 75. 
 117. See Council of Economic Advisers, Mapping the Digital Divide (2015). 
 118. File & Ryan, supra note 103. 
 119. See Andrea Peterson, Why the South Lags Behind When It Comes to Home Broadband Use, 
Wash. Post (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/11/17/why-the-
south-lags-behind-when-it-comes-to-home-broadband-use/. 
 120. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 19. 
 121. Id.; see also Zickuhr & Smith, supra note 22. 
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opt to not own a computer.122 And, yet, about twenty-one percent of non-
adopters admit to their lack of sophistication or literacy about the online 
world.123 
2. Race and Ethnicity 
Race and ethnicity also bear on availability and adoption rates. 
Tribal communities, for example, are more likely than others to lack 
service.124 This, however, is largely because any group, irrespective of 
race or ethnicity, is less likely to have access in rural areas.125 Most racial 
and ethnic minorities, on the other hand, live in and around urban areas 
where population density is characteristically very high and broadband is 
likely to be available. But, while access has increased dramatically across 
demographic groups in just the past five years, racial disparities in 
Internet access, adoption, and use persist even in cities. As of 2013, about 
sixty-five percent of Hispanic households and sixty percent of non-
Hispanic Black households have broadband at home.126 Compare this to 
the seventy-six percent of non-Hispanic White households with such 
connections.127 Observers generally attribute the low adoption rate of 
Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black households to the prohibitively high 
cost of service or equipment.128 
A recent Field Poll in California also found that adoption rates 
among Latinos are starkly lower than those for other demographic 
groups. While seventy-five percent of all adults in California have 
broadband service at home, that rate is thirty-two percent for those who 
 
 122. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,409 ¶ 152. 
 123. Zickuhr & Smith, supra note 22; see also John B. Horrigan, Digital Readiness: Nearly 
One-Third of Americans Lack the Skills to Use Next-Generation “Internet of Things” Applications 
(2014), http://jbhorrigan.weebly.com/uploads/3/0/8/0/30809311/digital_readiness.horrigan.june2014.pdf. 
See generally The Complexity of “Relevance” as a Barrier to Broadband Adoption, Benton Found. 
(Jan. 6, 2016 3:55 PM), https://www.benton.org/blog/complexity-relevance-barrier-broadband-adoption? 
utm_campaign=Newsletters&utm_source=sendgrid&utm_medium=email (“[S]uccessful interventions 
will need to unpack the relevance concept and address “ability to pay” instead of ‘willingness to pay’ 
for broadband at home. Further research, including additional questions on nationwide broadband 
adoption surveys, is also needed to establish a more in-depth understanding of relevance as an issue, 
particularly for individuals and families in low-income communities where cost remains the most 
significant barrier to adoption.”). 
 124. See Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,378 ¶ 73. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Smith, supra note 90 (noting that Pew does not collect data on broadband adoption and use 
by Asian Americans largely because Asian Americans constitute “a very small slice of the population, 
3.7 percent in the 2000 Census”).  
 127. Id. 
 128. See Danielle Keh et al., The Cost of Connectivity 2014: Data and Analysis on Broadband 
Offerings in 24 Cities Across the World, Open Tech. Inst. (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.newamerica.org/
oti/the-cost-of-connectivity-2014/. 
I - Sylvain_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:42 PM 
468                                           HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:443 
have not graduated from high school and forty-six percent for Latinos.129 
The consequences of these disparities are significant. As one example, 
consider that Latinos, even as the most underinsured group in the 
country, have been the least likely to enroll in health insurance through 
HealthCare.gov under the Affordable Care Act largely because of the 
language barrier and a related distrust of government.130 
Race and ethnicity also figure into the availability and quality of 
service in schools. According to one recent report, schools that serve 
large populations of African American and Latino students are nearly 
half as likely as predominately White schools to have access to 
broadband.131 
Race, moreover, is significantly correlated with the kind of device 
on which users rely to access the Internet. According to the Pew 
Research Internet Project, for the past couple of years, Blacks and 
Latinos have become almost twice as likely as Whites to rely on their 
smartphones as their exclusive means of accessing the Internet.132 Even if 
they are as likely as Whites to own any sort of mobile phone, researchers 
have found that Blacks and Latinos report outsized reliance on smartphones 
and other wireless devices to gain access to the Internet.133 
In some regards, this mobile trend is good news because it suggests a 
way to close the “digital divide” in Internet access.134 Blacks and Latinos 
use their wireless devices at greater rates to play music, record and watch 
videos, access social networking sites, check their bank balance, or 
participate in a video chat. Whatever intervention policymakers undertake, 
they should explicitly consider that mobile broadband is the main way 
through which historically underserved communities gain access. 
But the new trend also is a peculiar kind of achievement since, 
today, mobile service is not as speedy or reliable as wireline service on a 
 
 129. Patrick May, Poll: California’s Digital Divide Still Gaping, SiliconValley.com (July 8, 2014, 
8:58 AM), http://www.siliconvalley.com/ci_26108198/poll-californias-digital-divide-still-gaping. These 
statistics are notable because California is otherwise popularly understood to be where most online 
innovation occurs. 
 130. See Cheryl Corley, Language Remains a Barrier in Latino Health Care Enrollment, NPR (Jan. 
20, 2014, 7:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/20/263361444/language-remains-a-barrier-in-latino-
health-care-enrollment; April Dembosky, Selling Health Care to California’s Latinos Got Lost in 
Translation, NPR (Mar. 6, 2014, 7:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/03/06/286226698/ 
selling-health-care-to-californias-latinos-got-lost-in-translation. 
 131. See John B. Horrigan, Alliance for Excellent Education, Schools and Broadband 
Speeds: An Analysis of Gaps in Access to High-Speed Internet for African American, Latino, 
Low-Income, and Rural Students 89 (2014). 
 132. Aaron Smith, Pew Research Ctr., 35% of American Adults Own a Smartphone 15 (July 
2011) (finding specifically, thirty-eight percent of Black/Latino smartphone users rely on their 
smartphones while seventeen percent of non-Hispanic Whites do so); Zickuhr & Smith, supra note 22, 
at 19 (reflecting that this distribution might reflect the role of median income, since users with incomes 
of less than $30,000 were more than twice as likely as those with incomes of $50,000 or more to do so). 
 133. Aaron Smith, Pew Research Ctr., African Americans and Technology Use (2014). 
 134. File & Ryan, supra note 103, at 12. 
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variety of measures. First, the propagation characteristics of most wireless 
service today does not yet afford anything close to the transmission speed 
of fixed wireline service.135 Second, while smartphone devices are 
interactive and user-friendly, they generally do not deliver services or 
opportunities anywhere near the range or depth as those offered by 
PCs.136 Of course, mobile phones are more geographically flexible and, as 
a result, afford a range of sophisticated location-based applications that 
are less relevant for, say, a desktop computer. Still, the mobile device 
experience is hardly as immersive. Specifically, mobile users’ search 
engine entries are not as detailed or probing and the possibilities for 
content creation are substantially limited. The most successful start-ups 
and homework assignments rarely spring from a mobile device alone.137 
In short, broadband access through smartphones and tablets are simply 
not a substitute for PCs.138 
C. The Costs of Disparity 
Race, ethnicity, and income determine Internet access, adoption, 
and use. Yet, we might downplay the disparities in broadband service as 
long as they are not as egregious as disparities in, say, education, health 
care access, or housing. We might just assume that the uneven 
distribution of broadband service in the United States is not as worthy of 
alarm if it just reflects a social arrangement that tolerates worse 
disparities in those and other important areas of public life. 
If the Internet is the dominant general use technology of our time,139 
however, broadband service disparities pose a far more perilous problem 
than policymakers have yet to acknowledge. It does not matter that the 
marginal Internet user has the mere potential to realize her respective 
communicative capacity on a free and open Internet. Any regulatory 
approach that allows service providers to privilege users and edge 
providers with the wherewithal to pay for better connections would 
undermine the core objective of communications law. Such specialized 
treatment would effectively limit other users’ ability to pursue online 
opportunities and curtail small developers’ relative ability to innovate. 
Those who do not have the fastest broadband connections might be able 
to invent, study space science, obtain good healthcare, or organize 
movements. But they do so from a position of relative disadvantage. This is 
to say nothing of the multifarious forms of learning and social engagement 
that they would gain with faster or more reliable connections. 
 
 135. Noam, supra note 23, at 475 (explaining that fiber optic and cable technologies are “20 to 100 
times as fast as optimistically projected 4G rates”). 
 136. Napoli & Obar, supra note 18, at 323, 326.  
 137. Id. at 327–29. 
 138. See Crawford, supra note 24, at 235556. 
 139. Cf. Plotkin, supra note 15. 
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That broadband service disparities track deeply salient demographic 
factors like race, ethnicity, and income is doubly alarming because, again, 
if the Internet is the defining general use technology of our time, it will 
perpetuate inequalities across substantive areas, no matter how altruistic 
and innovative some networked elites are. This account undercuts the 
trickle down theory of Internet innovation. It suggests that, even when 
networks are open, extant structural patterns of exclusion will determine 
the ways through which users will gain access to and experience the 
Internet. Thus, to put it starkly, even though data transmissions on the 
Internet do not consider race, ethnicity, or incomes, the quality of users’ 
respective connections refract through those persistent demographic 
variables.140 Until policymakers do away with broadband service disparity, 
economically and sociopolitically disadvantaged groups will not be able 
to contribute to or enjoy the fruits of innovation online in the same way 
that others do. Without positive intervention addressed to disparity-qua-
disparity, these disadvantages will worsen. 
Of course, there are no guarantees that mere membership in 
networks will yield benefits.141 The value of networks depends on so 
much more, including the duration, intensity, and reciprocity of their 
constituent connections.142 The relative advantage that privileged groups 
hold in income, wealth, educational attainment, and job security, for 
example, reproduces itself online and offline over time until it eventually 
becomes entrenched in both. Unless substantially reversed, these 
advantages become “durable”online and off.143 Exclusion in this way 
worsens existing disadvantage.144 
The costs of cumulative disadvantage over time are great. Social 
science research on social networks has shown that exclusion is costly 
because inclusion, its opposite, has benefits that only accrue to 
 
 140. Cf. Osagie K. Obasogie, Blinded by Sight 181 (2014). 
 141. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community 19 (2000); see also Ben Fine, Social Capital Versus Social Theory: Political Economy 
179–80, 182 (2001); Nan Lin, Building a Network Theory of Social Capital, in Social Capital: Theory 
and Research 3, 11 (Nan Lin et al. eds., 2001). 
 142. See Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Am. J. Soc. 1360 (1973). 
 143. Daria Roithmayr, Reproducing Racism: How Everyday Choices Lock in White 
Advantage 5–7, 59–60, 110, 133 (2014); see id. at 88 (discussing work of Glenn Loury). Roithmayr 
discusses the divide between Blacks and Whites; but social science research shows similar trends across 
class and ethnicity as well. Residents in impoverished or otherwise materially underserved 
communities across the country tend to remain in those circumstances only because their relative 
opportunities are not as abundant. Id. at 89; see also William Julius Wilson, The Truly 
Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy (1990); Loïc J. D. Wacquant & 
William Julius Wilson, The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City, 501 Annals of Am. 
Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 8 (1989). 
 144. Crow, supra note 21. 
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networked members over time.145 There is a measureable opportunity 
cost for every minute a user is not as well connected as others. By way of 
illustration, consider current controversies involving high-frequency 
trading (“HFT”) in electronic securities exchanges.146 Highly leveraged 
HFT firms design computer programs to execute high volume trades by 
the millisecond in order to achieve the firms’ respective investment 
strategies.147 By doing so, the firms expect to gain a quantifiable 
advantage over competitors. The idea is that, even if any single trade 
yields an infinitesimally small margin of profit, in the aggregate, such 
efforts can prove profitable in even the most stable sectors of the economy. 
To be sure, the distributional problems in the broadband setting are 
far more complicated than those in electronic exchanges. But 
developments in HFT dramatically illustrate the relative costs of exclusion 
and disparity in informational networks. Firms with only mediocre or 
conventional access to “market-moving” information will fail to stay 
apace with better resourced competitors.148 Such disparity in the context 
of electronic exchanges might be the cold reality of how capital markets 
work. But, in the broadband setting, the costs of exclusion are far direr 
because Internet access affords far more than the ability to trade on 
“market-moving” information. 
This is not just a theoretical claim. Internet access has real 
implications in education, employment, and employability, for example. 
Elementary and secondary school students who do not have adequate 
online access at home risk falling behind their peers because, among 
other things, they cannot complete Internet-related homework as easily 
as their peers.149 Indeed, children’s grades improve when schools supply 
computers through which the students can access the Internet from 
home.150 Macroeconomic indicators suggest moreover that, when more 
 
 145. See Paul Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in Handbook of Theory and Research of the 
Sociology of Education 46, 47–48 (J.G. Richardson ed., 1986); James S. Coleman, Foundations of 
Social Theory 300–05 (1990); Nan Lin, Social Capital: A Theory of Structure and Action (2001); 
Putnam, supra note 141, at 19; Barry Wellman, Structural Analysis: From Method and Metaphor to 
Theory and Substance, in Social Structures: A Network Approach 19, 19–22 (Barry Wellman & 
S.D. Berkowitz eds., 1988). 
 146. The SEC only authorized electronic exchanges in the late 1990s.  
 147. In short, an HFT firm’s algorithm monitors and processes market activity in one or more 
sectors of the economy. When some threshold strategic condition is met, the program executes an 
extremely high volume of trades on behalf of the firm in a matter of milliseconds. Rarely do these 
firms hold a position for long; they only hold it as long as the algorithm deems necessary to minimize 
risk and maximize gain of loss on every individual trade before other market actors can act. 
 148. To be sure, HFT helps bring more liquidity to the market and, as a result, arguably makes the 
markets more efficient. But emergent HFT practices sometimes violate the letter if not the spirit of 
SEC insider trading and fair disclosure rules meant to ensure that the investing public has equal access 
to market-moving information. 
 149. Connected Texas, Broadband and Education––Connecting Students in Texas (2014). 
 150. Id. 
I - Sylvain_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:42 PM 
472                                           HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:443 
people are well connected, society as a whole benefits.151 For example, 
even the smallest increases in broadband penetration rates are strongly 
correlated with significant increases in the number of jobs and aggregate 
household income in some areas.152 Users are also much more likely to be 
politically engaged or to access government services when they have 
reliable connections.153 
It is for these reasons that Congress’s primary charge to the FCC 
under the Communications Act is to attend to substantive distributional 
concerns. But the agency did not really evince any meaningful 
recognition of this charge in its recent network neutrality proceeding 
until public reaction forced it to do so. As I show in Part III below, the 
agency has focused myopically on finding the right innovation balance. 
To the extent the Commission has gestured toward redressing disparity, 
it has come as a result of public pressure to consider equality concerns. 
III.  The Unintended Opening in the Open Internet Rules 
In February 2015, the FCC substantially circumscribed the extent to 
which access providers could leverage their market position to extract 
fees from users and edge providers.154 The agency promulgated rules that 
control the manner in which access providers may administer Internet 
connections. The FCC asserts that the rules will ensure that access 
providers remain “neutral” in how they manage those connections; that 
is, access providers generally may not block or discriminate between 
different kinds of applications or content.155 
Until very recently, the agency has had difficulty finding a statutory 
basis for the intervention that the courts have been willing to accept. This 
really was a problem of the FCC’s own creation: until just this past 
February, the agency had classified the Internet under the Communications 
Act as an “information service” deserving of the lightest of regulatory 
oversight. In its final and most recent Open Internet Rules, however, the 
agency has departed from this approach, basing the new rules on its 
longstanding authority under the statute to regulate “telecommunications 
service,” a regulatory category reserved for common carriers like 
telephone companies.156 
 
 151. See Dutz et al., supra note 115, at 35–36. 
 152. Connect Michigan, Broadband’s Economic Impact in Michigan 2–3 (2013). 
 153. Connect Ohio, Making Government Accessible: E-Government Usage in Ohio 3 (2014). 
At the core of these material advantages of connection is the fact that users must be ready and 
comfortable with the technology. Thus, many observers have argued that “digital readiness” is above 
all else the most important determinant of online participation. See Horrigan, supra note 123, at 11–12.  
 154. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 7. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. 
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The legal form of the rules has changed, but the substantive 
justification has not. The “virtuous circle of network innovation and 
infrastructure development” remains the prevailing regulatory ideology 
at the FCC. The agency’s argument is that innovation in Internet 
applications will generate more user interest that, in turn, will induce 
access providers to invest in Internet infrastructure that, in turn, will 
benefit everyone. This is the trickle down theory of Internet innovation. 
This Part describes and critiques the way in which innovation has 
manifested itself in communications policy, focusing in particular on the 
Open Internet proceeding. It reviews the general content and form of the 
rules that the agency proposed last spring and chronicles the agency’s 
decision to settle on more robust regulation this past February. The 
FCC’s decision to apply common carrier principles to the regulation of 
broadband evinced its recognition of the Internet’s role and great 
potential as a platform for social and economic integration. That is, by 
classifying broadband as “telecommunications service” under Title II of 
the Act, the agency has opened up a range of regulatory possibilities to 
ensure that service providers take all users and edge providers as they 
are; they cannot discriminate or interfere with connections on the basis 
of content, applications, devices, or services. 
This is an opening for the agency to recapture the statute’s core 
objective. Part III demonstrates that, while innovation remains the 
animating concern for the agency and other federal policymakers, the 
FCC has shown a welcome interest in distributional fairness. But much 
must be done. This Part argues that while innovation is a powerful and 
useful concept, it is addressed to interests that are orthogonal to and 
potentially in tension with the broad distributional objectives of 
communications law. 
A. The Proposed Rules 
Last spring, the FCC proposed two different rules to promote the 
“open Internet.”157 The agency’s stated objective for both was to 
encourage application innovation.158 The proposed rules would do this by 
forbidding broadband providers from blocking user access to the Internet 
content, applications, service, and devices of their choice, as well as 
barring them from unreasonably discriminating against lawful Internet 
traffic.159 The proposed rules also would require access providers to be 
transparent about their local broadband network management practices. 
The agency also proposed a more flexible rule for mobile broadband 
 
 157. FCC, Fact Sheet: Chairman Wheeler Proposes Rules for Protecting the Open Internet 
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0204/DOC-331869A1.pdf. 
 158. Id. at 1. 
 159. Id. at 2. 
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providers, forbidding them only from blocking websites or competitors’ 
voice applications.160 Mobile providers would not be barred from 
unreasonably discriminating against network traffic.161 
But the two proposals took two different legal forms with important 
substantive implications. The first would allow access providers to 
negotiate “commercially reasonable” transmission terms with individual 
content developers (or “edge providers”) who are willing to pay for the 
specialized treatment. If broadband service were to remain an 
“information service” under Title I of the Communications Act, and that 
is what this first proposal would require, the agency would be required to 
give access providers sufficient leeway to offer different transmission 
terms to users and content providers. Under this first proposed rule, 
broadband providers like Comcast, for example, would be able to deliver 
content from Google (an “edge provider”) to subscribers much faster 
than content from abc.com (another “edge provider”) as long as the 
transmission terms with either company are “commercially reasonable.”162 
Under the proposal, the FCC would assess the validity of this kind of 
prioritization on an adjudicatory case-by-case basis.163 
The FCC’s second proposal would explicitly bar providers from 
discriminating between applications or application types, a practice that 
the agency would allow under the first proposal as long as prioritization 
is commercially reasonable. This second proposal would be authorized 
under the agency’s statutory power to regulate “telecommunications 
service” providers under Title II of the Communications Act.164 Under 
this proposal, then, all or a part of local broadband network management 
service would be reclassified as “telecommunications service” subject to 
the common carrier obligations under Title II.165 That is, the agency 
would no longer treat broadband service as an “information service” 
under Title I, something it has done since 2002. Rather, pursuant to Title 
II, the agency could forbid access providers, for example, from engaging 
in “unjust or unreasonable discrimination” in charges or services to edge 
providers.166 They could also require that access providers ensure that 
users and edge providers can connect with each other “seamlessly and 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Brian Fung, FCC Chair: An Internet Fast Lane Would Be ‘Commercially Unreasonable,’ 
Wash. Post (May 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/05/20/fcc-chair-
an-internet-fast-lane-would-be-commercially-unreasonable/; see also Press Release, FCC, Statement 
by FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler on Broadband Consumers and Internet Congestion (Jan. 29, 2015) 
(on file with author). 
 163. Fung, supra note 162. 
 164. FCC, supra note 157, at 1. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2015). 
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transparently . . . between and across telecommunications networks.”167 
Thus, under this second proposal, Comcast could not offer a better deal 
to Google on the basis of specialized (if also commercially reasonable) 
terms; it would have to hold itself out to the public as available to 
everyone on the same terms. The agency also invited comment on a 
variation of the Title II proposal that would classify traffic from major 
content developers as “telecommunications service.” This would include, 
for example, remote delivery services or “‘sender-side’ traffic sent in 
response to the subscriber.”168 
With both proposals, the FCC responded directly to a D.C. Circuit 
panel’s January 2014 decision that the agency’s 2010 Open Internet 
proposal, premised solely on Title I, did not make any allowances for 
commercially reasonable bargaining between “information service 
providers” and “edge providers.” The court concluded that, while the 
2010 rules were rational enough to survive judicial scrutiny under the 
Administrative Procedure Act,169 the Communications Act forbids them 
if they require “information service providers” to treat all affiliated and 
unaffiliated content equally.170 Such obligations, the panel explained, 
resemble common carrier regulation that, according to the Communications 
Act, the agency may impose only on “telecommunications service 
providers.”171 The 2010 proposal could not stand because the FCC was 
bound by its earlier decision to classify broadband as an “information 
service” (and not as “telecommunications service”).172 
The first of the 2014 proposals, what I call the Title I proposal, 
addressed the court’s concern by allowing for commercially reasonable 
bargaining between access providers and edge providers. The second 
proposal, what I call the Title II proposal, addressed the court’s concern 
by reclassifying broadband as a telecommunications service that could be 
subject to common carrier regulations under Title II. 
Until very recently, the agency telegraphed a clear preference for 
the Title I approach largely because the D.C. Circuit had already 
affirmed that the agency has valid authority under that provision.173 The 
Title II approach would require the agency to relitigate the question of 
its authority. 
After the close of the comment period, the FCC leaked a version of 
the rules that would be premised on its authority under both Title I and 
 
 167. See 47 U.S.C. § 256 (1996); see also 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2015). 
 168. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 7. 
 169. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The Commission has offered a 
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”). 
 170. See id. at 650. 
 171. 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2015). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 652. 
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Title II of the Communications Act.174 This “hybrid” approach would 
divide broadband into two separate kinds of services: retail service for 
lay users that would be subject to Title I and “back-end” service for edge 
providers that would be subject to Title II common carrier 
requirements.175 This hybrid approach would, on the one hand, allow 
access providers to differentiate lay users’ service quality based on the 
latter’s willingness to pay and, on the other hand, address the FCC’s 
interest in promoting application innovation. Prominent advocates of 
network neutrality actually proposed this hybrid proposal in their public 
comments to the agency.176 
The advantage of this approach is that it would not require the 
agency to reverse its decision issued over a decade ago to classify 
broadband service as an “information service” subject to Title I regulation. 
It would only require amending the existing regime to redress the 
wholesale distribution of edge providers’ data flows.177 
The hybrid approach, however, would also come with substantial 
risks and disadvantages. Most observers already assumed that access 
providers would challenge the rules no matter which form they took if 
any aspect of the new rule were to impose common carrier 
requirements.178 Access providers made that clear within hours after the 
FCC first leaked the purported compromise.179 
B. The Public Response 
The public reaction to the Title I and hybrid proposals was record 
breaking for the FCC. The agency received nearly four million 
comments. Their substance varied, of course, but the vast majority 
supported some form of regulatory intervention that would limit access 
providers’ ability to control transmission speeds and fees.180 They were 
focused above all on the rank unfairness of allowing some users and edge 
providers to have better and faster service than others.181 
 
 174. See Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Considering Hybrid Regulatory Approach to Net Neutrality, N.Y. 
Times (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/technology/fcc-considering-hybrid-regulatory- 
approach-to-net-neutrality.html?_r=0. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Adam Clark Estes, Mozilla Is Helping Tor Get Bigger and Better, Gizmodo (Nov. 10, 2014, 
2:39 PM), http://gizmodo.com/mozilla-is-helping-tor-get-bigger-and-better-1656860653.  
 177. See Gautham Nagesh, FCC ‘Net Neutrality’ Plan Calls for More Power Over Broadband, 
Wall St. J. (Oct. 30, 2014, 7:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fcc-net-neutrality-plan-calls-for-
more-power-over-broadband-1414712501?autologin=y. 
 178. See Jenna Greene, Telecoms Poised to Fight Obama’s Net-Neutrality Proposal, Nat’l L.J. 
(Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202676472698. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Lohr, supra note 27. 
 181. Id. 
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The cause was taken up by many others as well. Comedian and talk 
show host John Oliver sarcastically likened the FCC’s Title I proposal to 
airline travel, with most users getting something like the least 
comfortable seats and large Internet companies like Google and Amazon 
routinely getting first class treatment.182 Former FCC Commissioner 
Michael Copps similarly asserted in testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that, without aggressive regulatory intervention, the 
Internet could “become the playground of the privileged few that only 
widens the many divides that are creating a stratified and unequal 
America . . . [We are] heading toward an online future with fast lanes for 
the 1 % and slow lanes for the 99%[.]”183  
The hybrid approach, too, encountered stiff opposition. The 
resistance came from public interest groups, public figures, and other 
advocates who argued that the hybrid approach would still allow access 
providers to offer tiered levels of service as long as they were offered at 
commercially reasonable terms.184 Such tiering, opponents argued, would 
undermine innovation by users of all stripes.185 Advocates also observed 
that the drafters of the hybrid approach would have to address the 
requirement that “telecommunication services” under Title II must offer 
their service “for a fee.” Access providers do not currently charge 
websites and other edge providers a dedicated fee to connect to law 
users, nor would advocates of network neutrality want them to, as those 
fees would make it that much more costly for lay users to start online 
ventures.186 
Apart from public concern about the legal form of the rules, there 
were also questions about how the rules would treat transmissions across 
the backbone of the Internet, from originating service provider to 
terminating provider. To focus solely on the positive duties of local 
access providers in the last mile would be naïve since local access 
providers are not the only administrators of Internet connections. Large 
transit network operators like Cogent and Level 3 manage Internet 
traffic between local providers on behalf of prominent edge providers 
like Apple, Netflix, and Google.187 They do so through “peering” 
 
 182. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Net Neutrality (HBO television broadcast June 1, 2014). 
 183. Preserving an Open Internet: Rules to Promote Competition and Protect Main Street 
Consumers: Sen. Judiciary Comm. Field Hearing (2014) (testimony of Hon. Michael J. Copps). 
 184. See Jon Healey, Possible ‘Hybrid’ Net Neutrality Rules Get Chilly Reception, L.A. Times (Oct. 
31, 2014, 3:01 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-fcc-net-neutrality-hybrid-20141031-story. 
html#page=1. 
 185. See Barbara van Schewick, Will the FCC Ruin the Internet?, CNN (Nov. 7, 2014, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/07/opinion/van-schewick-net-neutrality/index.html. 
 186. See id.; Healey, supra note 184. 
 187. Robert McMillian, What Everyone Gets Wrong in the Debate over Net Neutrality, Wired (June 
23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/net_neutrality_missing/; Dan Rayburn, Apple 
Negotiating Paid Interconnect Deals with ISPs for Their Own CDN, StreamingMediaBlog.com (May 
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agreements on interconnection terms.188 Second, and more importantly, 
some large edge providers are entering into their own co-location 
agreements with local providers. Companies likes Google and Netflix 
have built content delivery networks and dedicated servers within last 
mile providers’ networks, giving them an advantage over competitors. 
The alternative is to rely on conventional “best effort” transmission 
protocols that are not well suited to their latency-sensitive high-bandwidth 
content that they transmit. 
C. The Final Rules 
The record-breaking public reaction to the proposed rules has to 
have a real impact on the agency’s decisionmaking.189 This past February, 
the FCC approved a flat ban on blocking, discrimination, and paid 
prioritization by fixed and mobile wireless providers.190 In short, the new 
rules prohibit: 
 blocking access to Internet “content, applications, services, and 
devices”; 
 impairing “Internet traffic on the basis of content, applications, 
services,” and devices; and 
 prioritizing any Internet traffic “in exchange for consideration” or 
prioritizing affiliated content, applications, and services.191 
The agency relied on its authority under Section 706 in Title I of the 
Communications Act, as well as its separate authority under Title II.192 
The Commission cited the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision last 
year to affirm that Section 706 supplied sufficient authority to regulate 
last-mile providers. The agency also found support in the court’s opinion 
for its claim to authority under Title II.193 Thus, in unequivocal terms, in 
these new rules, the agency has classified broadband as a telecommunication 
service subject to the traditional common carrier bar on discriminating 
between content, applications, and services. 
 
20, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2014/05/apple-negotiating-paid-interconnect-deals- 
with-isps-for-their-own-cdn.html; see also Joan Engerbretson, Level3 Wants FCC to Impose ISP 
Interconnection Requirements, Telecompetitor (July 8, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.telecompetitor.com/ 
level3-wants-fcc-impose-isp-interconnection-requirements/. 
 188. McMillian, supra note 187; Rayburn, supra note 187. 
 189. See Rob Faris et al., Score Another One for the Internet? The Role of the Networked Public 
Sphere in the U.S. Net Neutrality Policy Debate, Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y at Harvard U. 4 
(Feb. 10, 2015). 
 190. It also reiterated the requirement that providers be transparent about their network 
management practices. The transparency requirement, however, was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit. 
Nothing in the rule altered or broadened this requirement. 
 191. See FCC, supra note 157, at 2. 
 192. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 7, ¶¶ 5, 7 & 273–84. 
 193. Id. 
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As enshrined in the Act, the nondiscrimination principle in no 
uncertain terms forbids service providers from imposing 
unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, 
regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like 
communication service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, 
or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage 
to any particular person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject any 
particular person, class of persons, or locality to any undue or 
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.194 
As broadly written as this provision and related provisions might be, the 
agency has chosen not to apply the full sweep of common carrier 
obligations. Congress authorized the FCC to “forbear” from 
enforcement of certain requirements under Title II if “the public 
interest” requires it. In the new rules, the agency has invoked this power 
to announce that it will refrain from imposing duties that are otherwise 
applicable to telephone companies and other common carriers. Specifically, 
in the new rules, the FCC announced that it will forbear from imposing rate 
regulations or tariffs, pro-competitive unbundling requirements, and 
filing or accounting requirements.195 Such an approach, the Chairman has 
explained, is better tailored to the twenty-first century. 
Even after forbearing on enforcement of some common carrier 
requirements, however, the rules are far more robust than what the 
Chairman was forecasting during the comment period last summer.196 
They are certainly more stringent than most of the alternatives that the 
FCC has publicly considered for over the past decade. Among other 
things, the new rules generally forbid broadband providers from 
privileging one edge provider’s applications and content over another’s, 
irrespective of whether the preference is commercially reasonable. The 
bar on paid prioritization in particular protects against a wide range of 
schemes through which providers could advantage specific content and 
applications for any legal “consideration.” Drafted in this way, the rules 
ostensibly bar paid prioritization schemes as well as the emergent 
practice of “zero-rating” or “positive price discrimination.” 
The rules also implemented a wide range of procedures and 
obligations otherwise applicable to common carriers. For example, the 
 
 194. 47 U.S.C. § 202 (2015). 
 195. Forbearance here raises interesting questions. First, in the agency’s framing, the “public 
interest” requires that it forbear from applying certain provisions of Title II. It is hard to know, 
however, how far the agency may go without more clarity on what the “public interest” entails in this 
setting. Second, the Administrative Procedure Act requires the agency to subject substantive 
regulatory revisions to public notice and comment. The agency’s action also raises interesting 
questions about whether it must subject any modification of its forbearance decision in this most 
recent Order to notice and comment. 
 196. Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler: This Is How We Will Ensure Net Neutrality, 
Wired (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/fcc-chairman-wheeler-net-neutrality/. 
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FCC would be able to investigate consumer complaints and enforce 
related provisions.197 Providers will also have to abide by consumer privacy 
rules,198 ensure equal access to indispensable physical infrastructure like 
poles and conduits to competitors,199 and provide access to people with 
disabilities.200 
Finally, the rules also address the interconnection terms between 
the large transit network operators like Cogent Communications (who 
carry Netflix and other major edge providers’ data) and the local 
broadband providers.201 The latter are the gatekeepers to users. The new 
rules assert for the first time that the FCC has the authority to review 
interconnection practices that are not “just and reasonable.”202 
Together, these new Open Internet Rules represent a 
modernization of the requirements under Title II in that they incorporate 
nondiscrimination and other principles in common carrier regulation. At 
the same time, however, by invoking its forbearance authority under 
Section 706, the agency has signaled its intention to be far more flexible 
than Title II would otherwise allow. Thus, the agency will refrain from 
imposing rate regulation, unbundling requirements, new taxes, new fees, 
“or other forms of utility regulation.”203 
IV.  Toward Network Equality 
The public’s reaction to the FCC’s original Open Internet proposal 
in 2014 was not as concerned with the form or pace of innovation as the 
unadorned problem of disparity. The main criticism was that the status 
quo is unfair to the extent it permits “fast lanes” for firms and developers 
who can afford prioritized treatment and slower connections for users 
and “start-up companies that do not have the cash to pay the tolls.”204 
This response was consistent with contemporaneous polling that showed 
overwhelming majority support for more robust Open Internet Rules.205 
 
 197. FCC, supra note 157, at 2; see also 47 U.S.C. § 208 (2015); id. §§ 206, 207, 209, 216, 217. 
 198. FCC, supra note 157, at 3; see also 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2015). 
 199. FCC, supra note 157, at 3; see also 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2015). 
 200. FCC, supra note 157, at 3; see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 255 (2015). 
 201. See Todd Shields, Netflix Deals with Broadband Providers Said to Be Getting New FCC 
Oversight, Bloomberg Bus. (Jan. 28, 2014; 4:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
01-28/netflix-deals-with-broadband-providers-said-to-get-fcc-oversight. 
 202. See id. 
 203. FCC, supra note 157. 
 204. See Wyatt, supra note 27. 
 205. Mario Trujillo, Poll: Voters Support Broad Concept of Net Neutrality, Hill (Jan. 21, 2015, 
10:31 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/230226-poll-voters-support-broad-concept-of-net-neutrality 
(showing support for restrictions on “blocking, discriminating against, slowing down, or charging for 
Internet traffic to certain websites”); see also Press Release, Univ. of Del. Ctr. for Political Commc’n, 
National Survey Shows Public Overwhelmingly Opposes Internet “Fast Lanes” (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file 
with author). 
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The FCC Chairman was clearly affected by the public reaction. By 
the time the agency published its final rules, he explicitly acknowledged 
the naïveté of the unmodified trickle down approach, even assuming 
personal responsibility for the agency’s position before the switch.206 The 
rules accordingly now subject broadband service to unequivocal 
nondiscrimination and other common carrier rules.207 So, even as 
policymakers at the FCC continue to believe above all that the Internet 
is a platform for innovation, it also now seems to recognize that the 
relative quality of users’ access should be a part of the public policy 
calculus. 
Although welcome, the FCC’s approach is insufficient to remedy 
the deep disparities outlined in Part II. Policymakers can and must do 
much more. Under the view I propose here, the Internet is not simply a 
boutique curiosity with which engineers and computer scientists should 
be allowed to tinker. Nor is it simply a data rich resource for inventors 
and companies to exploit. The controlling view ought to be that 
broadband is a service like electricitythat it is an essential general use 
resource to which everyone should have the same or nearly the same 
access as a matter of course.208 Accordingly, the longstanding and 
uncontroversial central objective of communications law and 
policyuniversalityshould displace (or at least complement) the 
preoccupation with innovation. 
The statutory commitment to universal broadband deployment is 
better understood as a concern for substantive equality in the delivery of 
communication services. As explained in Part I, the amended 
Communications Act speaks in relative terms about broadband availability. 
It provides, for example, that telecommunications and information service 
and rates in all areas of the country must be “reasonably comparable to” 
the best available service.209 The clear implication is that the success of 
deployment depends on whether broadband is available to all users on 
relatively similar terms, no matter whom or where the subscribers are. 
 
 206. See Wheeler, supra note 196 (“Originally, I believed that the FCC could assure internet 
openness through a determination of ‘commercial reasonableness’ under Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. While a recent court decision seemed to draw a roadmap for using 
this approach, I became concerned that this relatively new concept might, down the road, be 
interpreted to mean what is reasonable for commercial interests, not consumers.”).  
 207. This shift does not raise notice problems under the Administrative Procedure Act because the 
agency made clear in its notice of public rulemaking that it was also considering reclassifying 
broadband as a Title II common carrier. See generally Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 
1098, 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that the 
notice in the Federal Register of a proposed rulemaking contain ‘either the terms or substance of the 
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.’”). 
 208. See Tom Vilsack & Penny Pritzer, Broadband: The Electricity of the 21st Century, White House 
(Jan. 15, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/01/15/broadband-electricity-21st-century. 
 209. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3) (2015). 
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This final Part lays out the contours of what network equality 
requires as a matter of policy and research. First, I make the positive 
argument for its distinctivenessthat is, in relation to the prevailing 
approach. Second, I identify several examples in current federal 
policymaking that showcase how a particularized focus on network 
equality has begun (and should continue) to shape communications 
policymaking. In the end, I offer this Part as the foundation for more policy 
and scholarly work in the area. 
A. Substantive Communications Equality 
As demonstrated above, the prevailing view of the Internet among 
communications policymakers and scholars is that it is something like an 
innovation machine. Some scholars, however, have developed modified 
versions of the view favoring innovation that are not as myopically 
devoted to the trickle down theory. One prominent claim, for example, is 
that the Internet, in addition to being an engine for commerce, is also a 
“public and social infrastructure” whose social value “is tied to the range 
of capabilities it provides for individuals, firms, households, and other 
organizations to interact with each other and to participate in various 
activities and social systems.”210 According to this conception, Internet 
participation has spillover effects that benefit the most active users, as 
well as those who are not online.211 YouTube, for example, is not just 
beneficial because it creates value for Google, its parent company, or for 
users who post videos, but because it also “incidentally generate[s]” 
value for the users who watch the content.212 Sometimes these secondary 
benefits are small in scale; sometimes they are big. But all users are 
beneficiaries. 
This approach is essentially a restatement of the prevailing trickle 
down theory to the extent it posits that everyone in society is the 
downstream beneficiary of innovation on the Open Internet.213 It asserts 
that the Internet’s main value is generated by the transformative “killer 
apps” designed by networked elites.214 Here, universality is also important, 
but only instrumentally or secondarily so. 
Other scholars are far more direct in their claim that universal 
deployment ought to guide public policy. Even for these scholars, 
however, universality is an instrumental good that helps to stimulate 
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economic growth.215 This view holds that, if robust nondiscrimination 
rules are in place, every additional participant and connection increases 
the probability of new synergies and collaborations, which, in turn will 
contribute to economic growth.216 
To be sure, broad and unimpeded connections to YouTube or 
Facebook can generate socially valuable macroeconomic spillover effects 
for society at large.217 But my claim here is both more general and 
particular than this. I argue that, apart from the increases in general 
social welfare, universal access and use create opportunities for social 
integration for users who are excluded or otherwise structurally 
disadvantaged in society generally. This contention is partly born from 
the positive terms of the Communications Act itself: that all Americans 
must have reasonably comparable broadband service irrespective of 
whom or where they are.218 Under law, it does not matter whether they 
contribute to innovation in any appreciable way. 
This claim for universality, however, really flows from the normative 
commitment that communications are social and relational by their 
nature, and that they generate a sense of inclusion and solidarity that is 
itself valuable.219 This claim is especially salient for the least fortunate 
among us. That is, promoting and protecting communications equality is 
redistributive in the same way racial integration is. Internet connections 
are the means by which people associate with and otherwise engage their 
culture in ways that are harder to do without a network connection. We 
might frame this in purely welfarist terms. As I observe in Part II, there 
are strong correlations between online participation rates in local 
communities and higher employment rates and income. With greater 
connectivity, historically disadvantaged communities are likelier to 
become active participants in the economy and culture. 
But we can go further: regulations and programs that promote and 
protect network equality help to redress the structural barriers that 
historically disadvantaged groups in the United States routinely experience 
in all other aspects of public life. We might assume that this is nothing 
more than a question of semanticsthat I employ the language of 
equality and integration, where the prevailing approach relies on tropes 
in economics and network theory.220 That assumption, however, would 
misunderstand the point of my argument here. I argue for a reorientation 
 
 215. See Crawford, supra note 47, at 390; Richard S. Whitt & Stephen J. Schultze, The New 
“Emergence Economics” of Innovation and Growth, and What It Means for Communications Policy,  
7 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 217, 263 (2009). 
 216. See Crawford, supra note 47, at 390; Whitt & Schultze, supra note 215, at 263. 
 217. Cf. Sylvain, supra note 30.  
 218. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b) (2015). 
 219. Cf. Sylvain, supra note 30. 
 220. Cf. Kang, supra note 31, at 6–7. 
I - Sylvain_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:42 PM 
484                                           HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:443 
toward network equality because the prevailing approach has things 
backwards. At least, the prevailing trickle down theory overemphasizes 
the material consequences of broadband deployment at the expense of 
the statutory and normative reasons for equality and integration. The 
statutory command to ensure network equality matters, I argue, because 
it charges policymakers to take affirmative steps to give everyone an 
opportunity to engage (that is, benefit from and add to) online 
opportunities and associations irrespective of who or where they are. 
And the reasons for this are important. Broadband is the gateway to a 
vast world of services and opportunities otherwise beyond many users’ 
structurally impaired reach; the Internet is a transformative general use 
technology that could reverse historical and existing patterns of 
oppression, discrimination, bias, and harassment because it is so 
pervasive and indispensable. 
In this way, my argument here takes up an observation that scholar 
Jerry Kang made eight years ago. In Race.Net Neutrality, Kang 
presciently puzzled through the contrasting ways in which scholars 
conceived of nondiscrimination in the network neutrality debate (back 
then) by comparing it to the law and language of civil rights.221 In the 
network neutrality debate, he explained, consequentialist arguments 
tended to predominate; in the context of civil rights, however, scholars 
and policymakers were likelier to invoke non-welfarist deontological 
concerns.222 Kang argued that, at a theoretical level, however, there is 
nothing inevitable or natural about the contrast in approaches. After all, 
he observed, many grassroots network neutrality activists invoked 
deontological concepts of democratic participation and free speech.223 
But, for whatever reasons, Kang continued, those deontological concerns 
did not have currency in the mainstream policy debate about broadband 
network management policy where welfarist considerations prevailed. 
Little had changed until the FCC adopted the current Open Internet 
Rules. Today, the deontological equality concerns that animate civil 
rights policymaking have found themselves in the FCC’s rationalization 
for network neutrality. To be sure, the agency continues to rely above all 
on the trickle down theory to frame the legal basis of the rule. But, as 
discussed above, the agency has also evinced worry about disparity as 
such. This pivot has not merely been semantic. The agency relied on this 
concern in part to overtly reject the argument that service providers 
should be able to discriminate between users or edge providers, or 
apportion the quality of service based on the underlying service, 
applications, or content as long as commercially reasonable. To do so, 
 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 8. 
I - Sylvain_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:42 PM 
February 2016]     NETWORK EQUALITY 485 
the agency now asserts, would create disparities between the haves and 
the have-nots. 
To be clear, my argument here is not to remove consequentialism 
from policymaking in this area altogether. Even civil rights law and 
policy today recognizes that the best evidence of illegal discrimination is 
often in its quantifiable ex post discriminatory impact. Illegal 
discrimination is not just measured by the evidence of the wrongdoer’s 
bigotry because most bigots now know better than to advertise their 
biases. Policymakers and courts recognize that the most useful measure 
of illegal discrimination in most settings is in the lived and calculable 
effects on protected groups.224 It is for this reason that most progressive 
civil rights laws attend to the ways in which the decisions of policymakers 
or private actors have a discriminatory impact on protected classes. 
Importantly, however, the measure of discriminatory impact operates in 
service of the core interest in promoting equality. Similarly, 
communications policymakers should come to understand the nature of 
disparity by understanding the empirical measure of “discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.”225 
B. Current Interventions in Furtherance of Equality 
Outside of the network neutrality debate, equality concerns have 
taken center stage in communication policy generally. This new focus has 
found expression, first, in fiscal policy and, second, in the positive 
regulation of broadband service generally. The first is comprised of 
substantial subsidies through the FCC as well as the Departments of 
Agriculture and Commerce to support broadband to the underserved 
and unserved. These take the form of means-tested discounts on monthly 
service fees, as well as direct grants to schools. The second set of 
interventions showcases the agency’s broad positive authority to redress 
disparity. Three recent interventions in particular are worth considering 
here. They generally include, of course, the Open Internet Rules, but 
here, I focus in particular on the decision by the FCC to treat mobile and 
fixed broadband providers equally. Other interventions along these lines, 
however, include the FCC’s recent decisions, first, to increase the 
regulatory definition of broadband and, second, to preempt state laws 
that forbid municipal participation in the market for broadband service 
delivery. 
All of these efforts seek one way or another to ensure that users and 
communities everywhere in the United States have an equal or at least a 
“reasonably comparable” opportunity to access the affordances of the 
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Internet. In this vein, the new Open Internet Rules are just a piece of the 
FCC’s regulatory turn toward broadband equality. Together, these 
interventions come far closer to actualizing the core objectives of the 
Communications Act than does the mere focus on innovation. 
1. Fiscal Policy 
Policymakers have employed a variety of regulatory strategies to 
ensure that as many members of the public have broadband service as 
possible, notwithstanding the limitations imposed by access providers. 
The most direct interventions to this point have been in fiscal policy.226 
Congress devised a partial solution for broadband disparity in the 
amended Communications Act. Among other things, it established 
federal subsidy programs with the intention of addressing structural 
disparities in the availability of communications services. Section 254 of 
the amended Communications Act in particular establishes a relatively 
elaborate process for assuring universal service. Under this provision in 
particular, the quality and cost of broadband service in all rural and high-
cost areas are on par with service and cost in cities.227 The FCC explicitly 
recognized that these provisions could very well apply pursuant to the 
agency’s decision to classify broadband as a telecommunications service.228 
Moreover, in 2009, as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”), Congress allocated a little over $7 billion 
in grant and loan programs to expand deployment and adoption in 
unserved and underserved areas throughout the country. Under that law, 
Congress charged the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture with 
the responsibility of administering these programs.229 
Congress has attempted to close the service gap in other ways as 
well. In 1996, for example, it created the “E-Rate program” in order to 
make broadband connectivity more affordable for schools and libraries.230 
Recently, the FCC announced that it would modernize the program in 
order to tackle deficient service in schools and libraries.231 The new rules 
require greater pricing transparency and consolidated purchasing 
systems, as well as expand funding to provide Wi-Fi networks at schools 
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and libraries in rural and poor school districts and to better enforce 
current rules.232 
Very recently, moreover, FCC Chairman Wheeler announced an 
initiative to expand the current means-tested program for telephone 
service to cover broadband as well. Since the 1980s, the Lifeline program 
sought to build on the recognition that landlines “had become crucial to 
full participation in our society and economy.”233 Chairman Wheeler’s 
proposed reform would allow eligible residential subscribers to use the 
same subsidy of about ten dollars per month that they get for phone 
service to help cover the cost of broadband at home.234 
The FCC also has made it one of its top priorities over the past few 
years to extend and accelerate fixed and mobile broadband deployment 
to all of the places in which Americans live, work, and travel.235 Among 
other things, for example, it administers the high-cost universal service 
program and the Connect America Fund.236 The high-cost universal 
service program provides direct subsidies toward deployment. Through 
the Connect America Fund, the FCC invests in the construction of 
broadband networks in cooperation with access providers.237 There, the 
FCC has invested more than $438 million to bring service to 1.6 million 
people and intends on spending almost $9 billion in remote rural areas in 
the next five years.238 Other programs, while not as ambitious, are 
directed at resolving the same problem. The Mobility Fund, for example, 
provides one-time grants to construct next-generation mobile networks 
for communities in which there is none.239 
President Barack Obama, moreover, signed Executive Order 13616 
in 2012 in order to promote broadband deployment in federal buildings 
and rights-of-way.240 The Order’s central objective is to coordinate 
procedures and policies across federal agencies that have substantial land 
ownership or management responsibilities in order to assure that, when 
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possible, federal resources are used to lay infrastructure in service of 
broad deployment.241 
All of these efforts appear to have had a positive effect on 
deployment and adoption rates. The postmortem has yet to be written on 
the ARRA’s investment in broadband infrastructure, but that single 
intervention has gone further than most initiatives to bring high-speed 
broadband service to underserved communities. Clearly, however, fiscal 
policy interventions like these are not sustainable if they depend on 
shifting political winds. Something more will be needed in policy and law. 
2. Standardized Minimum Speed Thresholds 
Another way in which policymakers have promoted broader and 
more equal access is by requiring Internet access providers to supply a 
minimum quantum of transmission speed to qualify as a broadband 
provider. The threshold is a purely regulatory term of art, not an 
engineering concept. The agency has used it to create incentives for the 
deployment of broadband in high-cost and rural areas. The speed 
definition operates as a carrot rather than stick, because providers are 
entitled to some of the funding I identify above in Part IV.B.1 if they 
supply broadband service. 
Pursuant to its obligation to “review and reset” the broadband 
standard periodically,242 the FCC in January 2015 upgraded the threshold 
definition of broadband to 25 Mbps for downloads and 3 Mbps for 
uploads. This reform represents a substantial change from the 4/1 
benchmark it set just in 2010 which, at the time, was a remarkable 
increase from the now laughable 200 kbs standard, which only supports 
applications like e-mail.243 Before 2010, when the FCC implemented the 
4/1 standard, the speed benchmark was 200 kbps in both directions, 
which afforded little more than e-mail and the most elemental web 
surfing.244 The 2010 4/1 Mbps benchmark, on the other hand, enabled 
users to send and receive high-quality voice and video services.245 
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Service providers are likely to take up the FCC’s lead since 
consumers continue to demand faster broadband speeds to support new 
applications. Cloud storage, teleworking, gaming, and video streaming 
applications have become central to everyday life for many Americans,246 
and all, one way or another, require or accommodate speeds that far 
exceed conventional consumer-grade service of just five years ago. 
The new standard also better represents the current state of affairs 
since most providers purport to make at least 25 Mbps available to their 
subscribers. Generally, users who can afford it already have download 
speeds of 30 Mbps or higher. But, under the new definition, nearly 
twenty percent of homes in the United States would be in areas without 
such service.247 The majority of these areas are in rural areas.248 
Google, meanwhile, has invested in fiber optic networks in a few 
major U.S. cities that support more or less one gigabit per second upload 
and download speeds, one thousand times faster than the current FCC 
benchmark for upload connections.249 The Google Fiber service, 
moreover, costs about as much if not a little bit more than the most basic 
broadband service elsewhere around the country. The company 
accordingly offers casual users the same service speed for which 
generally only the largest companies pay ten times the price.250 
To be sure, some of the Google Fiber project is promotional 
gimmickry for the online search and advertising giant. On the other 
hand, the promise of new data capacity and fast transmission speed has 
spawned a niche market for innovative applications. The right question is 
not: why would anyone need “ultra high-speed” broadband? Rather, the 
better question is: which will be the next “killer application” to make us 
wish we all had such service? The robust competitive threat that Google 
Fiber poses could also motivate incumbents to invest more and improve 
service for consumers in the near future, at least in the markets in which 
Google has invested. 
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In any event, Google Fiber is just the beginning. Further 
improvements beyond one gigabit per second are on the horizon. 
Recently, for example, engineers discovered a method by which existing 
copper phone lines could actually support broadband speeds of up to ten 
gigabits per second at a fraction of the cost of current service.251 XG-Fast, 
as it is called, will enable providers to supply much faster service at far 
cheaper cost than they do today with existing fiber optic transmission 
technologies. The researchers behind this finding expect that users will 
begin to benefit from the discovery within the next year. 
XG-Fast represents the state of the art in transmission speed. In its 
most recent action, the agency explicitly asserted that it was merely 
upgrading the definition in order to meet consumer demand for new 
services that require more generous speed thresholds. In fact, providers 
around the country already had been providing speeds well over 25 
Mbps.252 The new standard just keeps the FCC up to speed on current 
services already available to most Americans. On this reasoning, the 
agency surely will have to reform the standard before long yet again. 
But the reform does more than keep up with current trends in 
service and new applications. The agency explicitly concluded that the 
speed upgrade would also reduce disparities experienced by underserved 
communities. After all, more than half of rural inhabitants lack access to 
high-speed broadband service.253 Current high-speed broadband service, 
it explained, is too valuable to be available to only a portion of potential 
users. The agency explicitly invoked its responsibility under Section 706 
to “expand robust broadband to all Americans in a timely way” to justify 
the benchmark reform. 
There are notable regulatory consequences of the agency’s reform 
of the broadband speed benchmark. As noted above, the agency 
subsidizes providers to improve and more widely deploy broadband 
infrastructure. Only companies that provide broadband as the agency 
defines it could be entitled to such support. Support like this could make 
it easier for smaller emergent high-speed providers to enter markets in 
which incumbents have failed to provide high-speed service. In these 
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ways, the standard is another lever on which the agency can rely to 
assure delivery of high quality service to all Americans. 
3. The Same Rules for Wireless Devices 
A third way by which federal policymakers have redressed racial, 
ethnic, and class disparities in broadband use is by requiring mobile 
providers to adhere to the same rules that fixed providers must follow. 
The Open Internet Rules do this by banning discrimination based on the 
device users rely on to connect to the Internet. 
Over half of Internet traffic travels over wireless networks. And 
more people today are relying on very high-quality wireless services to 
receive and transmit high-quality content and applications. Where, in 
2010, about 200,000 Americans subscribed to the fastest mobile broadband 
services, today, more than 120 million do, and almost 300 million users 
subscribe to some high-speed mobile network service.254 Today, 
distinguishing wireless service from fixed service makes little sense; they 
all comprise broadband service. 
Recognizing as much, the FCC decided to address its final rules to 
all broadband providersfixed and wirelessand, accordingly, extended 
protection to all users in equal measure no matter which devices they use 
to go online. This is a shift from the agency’s proposal in May 2014 to 
impose fewer requirements on mobile providers. The argument then, as 
it was four years before, was that wireless service was in its infancy and 
that service rules would impede innovation. 
The FCC’s Open Internet Rules reflect the important recognition 
among policymakers that, while wireless transmission speeds are closing 
in on fixed broadband speeds, different communities gain access to the 
Internet in different ways. That is, while mobile broadband use rates 
have climbed steadily across demographic groups from about thirty 
percent in 2010 to around fifty-five percent today, it remains the primary 
way of going online for a disproportionately higher number of rural 
residents and low income users, as well as Blacks and Latinos. Nearly 
two-thirds of Latinos rely on mobile connections to go online. And, 
according to some research, Blacks and Latinos have been early adopters 
of mobile technology, or at least are more likely to own a smartphone 
than Whites.255 The new rules accordingly redress another piece of 
disparity by recognizing that different communities access the Internet 
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with different devices. Consider, moreover, that the FCC is considering 
applying the 25 Mbps speed threshold to wireless.256 
4. Community Broadband for Everyone 
Finally, the fourth way in which federal policymakers have helped to 
redress broadband service disparities is by supporting efforts to operate 
or otherwise support broadband service by municipal governments. 
Private providers are an essential piece of the federal government’s 
advocacy of deployment and adoption. But they are not the only ones 
capable of delivering high-speed service to residents. Local governments 
across the country, too, have been developing or supporting broadband 
in their communities in cooperation with local anchor institutions and 
major stakeholders.257 Widely touted projects in Chattanooga, Tennessee 
and Wilson, North Carolina, for example, provide extremely high-speed 
one gigabit service to their residents at relatively competitive subscription 
rates.258 The former repurposed existing electricity infrastructure in ways 
that have since inspired other cities and towns.259 These services now are 
so fast and reliable that they rival anything else offered by local providers 
at the same rate, and has even drawn the interest of neighboring rural 
communities. 
Policymakers at the local and federal levels today advocate 
community broadband projects because those are generally the most 
effective ways of diversifying service options in communities with just 
one or two providers.260 Municipal service creates competition for 
broadband where there sometimes is little to none. Competition in the 
local market for service, they argue, stimulates innovation and investment 
in broadband infrastructure and generally inures to the benefit of local 
residents irrespective of how isolated their region may be. And, indeed, 
there are strong indications already that in every locality in which cities 
and towns have pursued municipal projects alone, or in partnership with 
a major stakeholder like Google Fiber, service providers have responded 
by offering comparable or near-comparable service.261 
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Plant Seizes Internet Access Business Opportunities (2015). 
 260. Jon Brodkin, Fed Up, US Cities Take Steps to Build Better Broadband, ArsTechnica (Oct. 27, 2014, 
6:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/10/fed-up-us-cities-try-to-build-better-broadband/. 
 261. See Jeff Baumgartner, AT&T Takes on Google Fiber in K.C., Multichannel News (Feb. 17, 
2015, 9:36 AM), http://www.multichannel.com/news/technology/att-takes-google-fiber-kc/388021. 
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Consistent with this vision, the President announced a new program 
late in 2014, BroadbandUSA, to promote municipal broadband by offering 
technical assistance to interested communities and publishing guidelines 
on infrastructure planning, financing, construction, and operations.262 In 
this regard, their advocacy of municipal broadband coheres with the broad 
policy objective of the Open Internet Rules to promote deployment. 
Local projects to provide broadband service could remedy racial, 
ethnic, and income disparities because those factors are so closely related 
to residency.263 But such laws face a significant obstacle in states that 
prohibit or significantly curtail municipalities’ legal authority to enter the 
market for service. At least nineteen states have such laws.264 Proponents 
of these restrictions argue, among other things, that municipal participation 
in the market for broadband service would undermine competition rather 
than encourage it because governments do not have to bear the same 
risks or pay the same operational costs and taxes as private corporations. 
They also argue that some municipal broadband projects are mismanaged. 
In any case, the FCC recently approved an application from Wilson 
and Chattanooga to preempt state laws in North Carolina and Tennessee 
that prevent them from offering broadband service to local residents.265 
Over the objection of providers from all over the country, the agency 
cited its authority under Section 706 of the amended Communications 
Act to remove barriers to infrastructure development.266 Congress, too, 
may intervene. The Senate is currently considering a bill that would 
amend the Communications Act to bar states from blocking municipal 
broadband.267 The FCC’s action here is in furtherance of competition in 
the market for broadband service. But it also advances the distributional 
concerns at the heart of the Communications Act to the extent it assumes 
all communities have a stake in ensuring its residents have high quality 
access to broadband. 
 
 262. See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Broadband That 
Works: Promoting Competition and Local Choice in Next-Generation Connectivity (Jan. 13, 2015) (on 
file with author). 
 263. Crow, supra note 21. 
 264. Sylvain, supra note 108, at 795. 
 265. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Finds FCC Grants Petitions to Preempt State Laws Restricting 
Community Broadband in North Carolina, Tennessee (Feb. 26, 2015) (on file with author). 
 266. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2015). The agency might also rely on its authority under a separate provision of 
the Communications Act under Title II to ensure that states do not impose rules that “prohibit or have the 
effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide” service. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (1996). 
 267. Brian Fung, Cory Booker’s Introducing a Bill to Help Cities Build Their Own, Public Internet 
Services, Wash. Post (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/01/21/ 
cory-bookers-introducing-a-bill-to-help-cities-build-their-own-public-internet-services/. 
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C. New Possibilities 
A reorientation toward redressing disparities in broadband 
deployment, adoption, and use could have significant implications for 
policymakers and scholars in a variety of other policy areas and ways 
today. The next Subparts briefly explore some of these implications in the 
specific contexts of housing and disparate law enforcement and surveillance. 
1. Housing and Broadband Use Patterns 
Consider housing policy. The intersection of residential segregation 
and broadband use has not been significantly studied by social scientists, 
legal scholars, or policymakers. But this intersection should be studied 
because such service patterns also track longstanding patterns of racial 
segregation in housing and, accordingly, correspond with the very 
problems to which fair housing laws are addressed.268 Indeed, in the wake 
of the Supreme Court’s recent decision to affirm disparate impact rules 
under the Fair Housing Act,269 federal officials have recently elaborated 
existing rules against housing segregation and expanded the number of 
resources they will devote to enforce such rules in recognition that 
residential housing patterns entrench a range of other structural 
disadvantages.270 
So, apart from attending to policy interventions that promote the 
same treatment of wireless and wired devices or that protect municipal 
broadband, federal communications policymakers could also help to 
redress racial disparities in Internet access and use by aligning federal 
civil rights laws addressed to residential housing patterns with residential 
broadband service patterns.271 Current statutory and regulatory 
authorities do not provide legal remedies to broadband subscribers 
against providers. Yet, fair housing laws suggest that, first, authorities 
should provide legal remedies, and, second––and just as importantly––
that local, state, and federal agencies might be complicit in furthering 
disparities in access along racial lines if they do not act to prevent it. 
Government policies on municipal franchising of cable broadband 
service, for example, arguably frustrate nondiscrimination norms in fair 
housing law if they further entrench racial disparities. This intuition 
 
 268. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 269. See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
 270. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama Unveils Stricter Rules Against 
Segregation in Housing, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/us/hud-issuing- 
new-rules-to-fight-segregation.html. 
 271. Here and elsewhere, I have written about the significant correlation between geography and 
the quality of broadband service. See Sylvain, supra note 108. 
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would have much to learn from and contribute to the rich scholarship on 
redressing inequality in housing policy.272 
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) 
seems to appreciate the important overlap between housing patterns and 
broadband access levels. In the past year, it has initiated an endeavor in 
collaboration with nonprofits and private actors to extend affordable 
broadband access to families living in HUD-assisted housing in twenty-
seven cities and one tribal area across the country.273 HUD has launched, 
moreover, a related demonstration project to measure the reach and 
impact of broadband connectivity in public housing.274 
2. Disparate Law Enforcement Surveillance and Broadband Use 
Such an approach might also cause scholars and policymakers to 
more consistently examine the ways in which the scope of privacy 
protection varies among the demographic groups, tracking the historically 
entrenched demographic fault line of race, for example. Scholars might 
begin to study, for example, how, if at all, race, ethnicity, and class 
interact with electronic surveillance practices of mobile device by law 
enforcement. Media reports already strongly suggest that the public 
social media accounts of prepubescent, teenage, and young adult Black 
men are disproportionately surveilled by law enforcement officials.275 
Focus on these questions and patterns would have much to learn from 
scholarship on privacy law and the disparate uses of networked devices.276 
In any event, findings on these questions could have implications for a 
whole set of scholarly and regulatory interventions. 
D. Equality’s Limits 
In spite of the substantial gains that the equality framing offers, full 
and equal user participation has its limits and pitfalls, too. First, 
Congress’s charge to the FCC to ensure reasonably comparable service 
to all Americans does not require that all Americans actually do the 
same things or even good things when they go online. Nor must users be 
equally entrepreneurial or sociable once they are online. Rather, as 
ambitious as the goal of universality is, the statutory command is limited 
 
 272. See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in 
American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1339, 1339 (2012). 
 273. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., President Obama and Secretary Castro 
Announce Initiative to Extend High Speed Broadband Access for Students in HUD-Assisted Housing 
(July 15, 2015) (on file with author). 
 274. Housing and Urban Development Notice, 80 Fed. Reg. 18248 (Apr. 3, 2015). 
 275. Rose Hackman, Is the Online Surveillance of Black Teenagers the New Stop-and-Frisk?, Guardian 
(Apr. 23, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/23/online-surveillance-black- 
teenagers-new-stop-and-frisk. 
 276. See, e.g., Napoli & Obar, supra note 18, at 326. 
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to ensuring that high-quality broadband service is available to all 
Americans.277 
For starters, users will have to go online. Many, however, just 
choose to stay disconnected out of defiance. There is little that 
communications policy can do on its face to require engagement. Indeed, 
there are good reasons users might choose not to be engaged, in so far as 
that choice is well informed. 
It is not at all clear, moreover, that everyone who is underserved or 
unserved will do much once they are online. We already know, for 
example, that users have varying degrees of “digital readiness.” 
According to one prominent report, nearly one-third of Americans self 
report low levels of knowledge of and confidence in using computers or 
finding information online.278 Around twenty percent of Americans, 
moreover, report low levels of digital readiness even though they have 
broadband at home.279 And about one-eighth of American households do 
not subscribe to broadband because they do not think the Internet is 
relevant to their lives.280 So, irrespective of the range of new applications 
and services that will be at their disposal, particularly after the FCC 
implements the reforms I outline above, many users will continue to stay 
disconnected. 
For those who do choose to connect, however, it is not at all clear 
that they will have the ambition to do more than interact in the most 
superficial or ephemeral ways. And, in any event, dangers await users 
nearly everywhere online. To begin, there are myriad incursions on 
privacy and consumer sovereignty that all users experience when they go 
online.281 But, in addition to these routine costs of online participation, 
historically disadvantaged groups are likely to confront a variation of the 
same obstacles and problems they experience in the physical world. The 
forms of racial bias in real estate and on the job market in the physical 
world, for example, are also likely to appear on the Internet. Consider 
Airbnb, the social networking service that enables people to rent out 
their homes to strangers. White users of the service generally earn twelve 
percent more than Black users.282 Or consider that, a couple years ago, 
 
 277. It is worth noting here that the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce have launched 
training and grant programs for people and institutions interested in improving digital readiness. See 
Community Connect Grants, U. S. Dep’t of Agric., http://www.rd.usda.gov/programs-services/community-
connect-grants (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); see also DigitalLiteracy.gov, http://www.digitalliteracy.gov 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 278. Horrigan, supra note 123, at 2. 
 279. Zickuhr & Smith, supra note 22. 
 280. Id.; see also supra Part II.B.1. 
 281. Pasquale, supra note 93, at 14345; Ohm, supra note 92. 
 282. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com, (Harvard 
Bus. Sch., Working Paper 14-054). Rating systems on share sites like Airbnb and Uber, for example, 
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search terms on Google that included Black-identified names generated 
advertisements suggestive of an arrest of a person with that name at an 
alarmingly high rate.283 Or consider that new forms of Internet data 
mining might introduce new forms of employment discrimination—
discrimination that is not easily accounted for under existing civil rights 
laws.284 Or consider that baseball cards or iPhones sell for significantly 
more when the hand showcasing the items in the listing photograph on 
an online shopping forum is White rather than Black.285 We might also 
suspect that improvements in broadband access could increase 
opportunities for law enforcement, insurance companies, creditors, and 
others to survey or collect information about historically disadvantaged 
communities in ways that perpetuate existing biases and structures of 
discrimination. 
All of these developments suggest that the pivot toward distributional 
concerns and equality in broadband policymaking could not have come 
any sooner. Presumably it means that policymakers will now attend to 
disparity and discrimination online in the same ways they have in the 
physical world.286 These developments also suggest an agenda for 
scholarship in communications and information law that is far less 
preoccupied with innovation for its own sake. 
Conclusion 
Communications scholars and policymakers have been myopically 
focused on promoting Internet innovation. They do so at the expense of 
the core distributional objectives of communications law. It is time they 
break free from their innovation fixation, and do the hard work of 
considering how everyone, including and especially members of historically 
marginalized groups, engage and participate in the Internet’s rich 
affordances. Scholars and policymakers must now ensure that law and 
policy affirmatively further substantive broadband equality. This Article 
provides a theoretical and positive legal roadmap for this work, which is 
an essential first step in redressing ongoing racial and income disparities 
that continue to mark our society. 
 
might also skew against Blacks. See Nancy Leong, The Sharing Economy Has a Race Problem, Salon 
(Nov. 2, 2014, 3:58 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/11/02/the_sharing_economy_has_a_race_problem/. 
 283. See Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery 4 (Harvard Univ., 2013), 
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 285. See Ian Ayres et al., Race Effects on Ebay 22–23 (Sept. 27, 2011), 
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